In September 1996, Congress passed Public Law 104-201, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title XIV of which was called the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation. It required DoD to enact "[A] program to provide civilian personnel of Federal, State, and local agencies with training and expert advice regarding emergency responses to a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction or related materials."

Specific actions that were authorized included the following:

• Using the National Guard and other reserve components for carrying out the program.
• Establishing "a designated telephonic link (commonly referred to as a 'hot line') to a designated source of relevant data and expert advice for the use of State or local officials responding to such emergencies."
• Loaning appropriate equipment.
• Assisting the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the "establishment of metropolitan emergency medical response teams (commonly referred to as 'Metropolitan Medical Strike Force Teams') to provide medical services that are necessary or potentially necessary by reason of a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction."
• Developing and maintaining "at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team composed of members of the Armed Forces and employees of the Department of Defense who are capable of aiding Federal, State, and local officials in the detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of weapons of mass destruction containing chemical, biological, or related materials."

Taken together, the result of all of this administration and congressional activity has been a dramatic increase in funding for antiterrorism, counterterrorism, critical infrastructure protection and programs countering WMD, across a broad array of functional areas. Federal spending for combating terrorism in Fiscal Year 2000 was estimated to be approximately $10 billion, including:

• $8.613 billion for antiterrorism and counterterrorism programs, including $1.385 billion for combating WMD; and
• $1.464 billion for protection of critical infrastructure and computer security, including $500,000 for R&D efforts.

To provide better oversight of this complex array of programs, Congress enacted subsequent language requiring the President to report annually on government-wide spending by departments and agencies to combat terrorism and WMD. In 1999, the Senate Armed Services Committee set up the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee "to provide a focus for the Department of Defense's efforts to counter new and emerging threats to vital national security interests, {A133}. such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism directed at US targets both at home and abroad, information warfare, and narco-trafficking."

In addition to efforts to mitigate the threats through the programs just described, US policymakers have sought to balance the need to alert the public against the desire to avoid creating panic or unfounded fears.

Homeland security has not been free of debate. A trial balloon that floated the idea of creating a separate unified command for homeland security was met with visible concern by organizations ranging from the American Civil Liberties Union to conservative groups. There are also indications that the notion of a broader DoD (and Army) role in crisis management has not yet been accepted by key agencies. In short, the evolution of the homeland security problem seems likely to play out in a turbulent political atmosphere.

Public attitudes
Although there has of course heightened public awareness of terrorism after the September 11 attacks, even well before the attacks opinion polls showed that the American people seem to have gotten the message on the danger of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Public opinion data reveal a differentiated set of attitudes that indicate a reasonable level of concern and a strong desire to see action taken against the threats but no expectation that the measures taken can ever eliminate the possibility of attacks:

• Although fewer than 1 percent of Americans think of terrorism when asked to identify the most important problem facing the country, more than half of those polled in September 1996 indicated that terrorism was one of the most important problems for the nation today, and about one in three polled in April 1997 identified terrorism as the greatest threat facing the United States in coming years, and the greatest threat to world peace.
• Nearly three out of four believe that there is a chance that terrorists could attack with WMD, but fewer than one in six said they worried a great deal about this.
  
• Similarly, nearly six in ten believe that a foreign country could launch a nuclear attack against the United States, although fewer than one in ten said they worried a great deal about it.
• When asked whether they perceive the greater threat of terrorism to come from inside or outside the country, nearly half (47 percent) indicated inside while four in ten said outside, and 11 percent volunteered "both."
• There also were indications at the time of the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995 that a slight majority of the public believed that bombings like that may become common in the future.

Regarding the government's response to the emerging threat:

• In July 1996, the public was evenly split between those who believed that the US government was doing enough to prevent terrorism in this country (48 percent) and those who did not think so (48 percent).
• More than half of those polled in April 1995 and March 1996 felt that antiterrorism laws were too weak.
• In August 1998, large majorities indicated they were following news reports on government activities to prevent terrorism. A total of 71 percent said that they had followed such reports very closely (33 percent) or fairly closely (38 percent).
• In August 1998, majorities indicated that they had a sober view of the difficulties in preventing terrorist incidents; when asked how many terrorist incidents officials would be able to prevent if they were given the tools they needed, more than half indicated that they would be able to prevent few or none, and fewer than 1 in 20 thought that all such attacks could be prevented.
• In 1999, substantial majorities indicated that reducing the threat of international terrorism should be a "top priority" of the US government.

The impression one gets from the public opinion data is that the public are concerned about homeland security issues and expect intelligence, law enforcement and defense officials to engage in the necessary planning and preparations, wherever possible, to prevent terrorist acts against the United States. Nevertheless, majorities also have a fairly realistic appraisal of the difficulties of preventing terrorist incidents--fewer than 1 in 20 believe that all future terrorist attacks could be prevented if law enforcement officials (and, presumably others) were given the tools they need.

Homeland security task areas
Our work suggests that homeland security should include at least five task areas. Three of these task areas emerge from the foregoing analysis:

• WMD domestic preparedness (DP) and civil support, ranging from counterproliferation activities to consequence management of incidents involving high explosives (HE), chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.
• Continuity of government (COG), i.e., efforts to reestablish at the earliest possible opportunity civilian political and legal authority following a catastrophic incident.
• Continuity of operations (COOP), including force protection against asymmetric homeland attacks during the fort-to-port sequence, critical infrastructure protection of mission-critical facilities and systems, and other activities.

To be complete, two additional task areas also should be included in homeland security:

• Border and coastal defense, the need for which arises from the possible threat of introduction into the United States of WMD or other weapons capable of mass casualties, and the possibility of large-scale refugee flows that could create national security problems and tax available civilian capacity.
• Although it is not addressed in this seminar, national missile defense.

While overlaps occur among these areas--WMD could be used, for example, against civilian targets, against government targets, or against military mobilization efforts--they collectively seem to capture the essence of the homeland security problem set.