- The chain or line network, as in a smuggling chain where people, goods or information move along a line of separated contacts, and where end-to-end communication must travel through the intermediate nodes.
- The hub, star, or wheel network, as in a franchise or a cartel where a set of actors are tied to a central (but not hierarchical) node or actor, and must go through that node to communicate and coordinate with each other.
- The all-channel or full-matrix network, as in a collaborative network of militant peace groups where everybody is connected to everybody else.
Each node in the diagrams may refer to an individual, a group, an organization, part of a group or organization, or even a state. The nodes may be large or small, tightly or loosely coupled, and inclusive or exclusive in membership. They may be segmentary or specialized--that is, they may look alike and engage in similar activities, or they may undertake a division of labor based on specialization. The boundaries of the network, or of any node included in it, may be well-defined or blurred and porous in relation to the outside environment. Many variations are possible.
Each type may be suited to different conditions and purposes, and all three may be found among netwar-related adversaries--e.g., the chain in smuggling operations; the hub at the core of terrorist and criminal syndicates; and the all-channel type among militant groups that are
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highly internetted and decentralized. There may also be hybrids of the three types, with different tasks being organized around different types of networks. For example, a netwar actor may have an all-channel council or directorate at its core but use hubs and chains for tactical operations. There may also be hybrids of network and hierarchical forms of organization. For example, traditional hierarchies may exist inside particular nodes in a network. Some actors may have a hierarchical organization overall but use network designs for tactical operations; other actors may have an all-channel network design overall but use hierarchical teams for tactical operations. Again, many configurations are possible, and it may be difficult for an analyst to discern exactly what type characterizes a particular network.
Of the three network types, the all-channel has been the most difficult to organize and sustain, partly because it may require dense communications. But it is the type that gives the network form its new, high potential for collaborative undertakings and that is gaining new strength from the information revolution. Pictorially, an all-channel netwar actor resembles a geodesic "Bucky ball" (named for Buckminster Fuller); it does not look like a pyramid. The organizational design is flat. gle, central leadership, command or headquarters--no precise heart or head that can be targeted. The network as a whole (but not necessarily each node) has little to no hierarchy; there may be multiple leaders. Decision-making and operations are decentralized, allowing for local initiative and autonomy. Thus the design may sometimes appear acephalous (headless), and at other times polycephalous (Hydra-headed).
The capacity of this design for effective performance over time may depend on the existence of shared principles, interests and goals--perhaps an overarching doctrine or ideology--which spans all nodes and to which the members subscribe in a deep way. Such a set of principles, shaped through mutual consultation and consensus-building, can enable members to be "all of one mind" even though they are dispersed and devoted to different tasks. It can provide a central ideational and operational coherence that allows for tactical decentralization. It can set boundaries and provide guidelines for decisions and actions so that the members do not have to resort to a hierarchy because "they know what they have to do" (Beam: see endnotes for references to critical works).
The network design may depend on having an infrastructure for the dense communication of functional information. This does not mean that all nodes must be in constant communication; that may not make sense for a secretive, conspiratorial actor. But when communication is needed, the network's members must be able to disseminate information promptly and as broadly as desired within the network and to outside audiences.
In many respects, then, the archetypal netwar design corresponds to what earlier analysts (Gerlach, 1987, p. 115, based on Gerlach and Hine, 1970) called a "segmented, polycentric, ideologically integrated network" (SPIN):
By segmentary I mean that it is cellular, composed of many different groups...By polycentric I mean that it has many different leaders or centers of direction...By networked I mean that the segments and the leaders are integrated into reticulated systems or networks through various structural, personal, and ideological ties. Networks are usually unbounded and expanding...This acronym [SPIN] helps us picture this organization as a fluid, dynamic, expanding one, spinning out into mainstream society (Gerlach: see endnotes for references to critical works).
Caveats about the role of technology
Netwar is a result of the rise of network forms of organization, which in turn is partly a result of the computerized information revolution. To realize its potential, a fully interconnected network requires a capacity for constant, dense information and communications flows, more so than do other forms of organization (e.g., hierarchies).
This capacity is afforded by the latest information and communication technologies--cellular telephones, fax machines, electronic mail (email), websites and computer conferencing. Such technologies are highly advantageous for netwar actors whose constituents are geographically dispersed.
But two caveats are in order. First, the new technologies, however enabling for organizational networking, are not absolutely necessary for a netwar actor. Older technologies, like human couriers, and mixes of old and new systems may do the job in some situations.
The late Somali warlord, Mohamed Farah Aidid, for example, proved very adept at eluding those seeking to capture him while at the same time retaining full command and control over his forces by means of runners and drum codes (see Bowden, 1999). Similarly, the first Chechen War (1994-6), which the Islamic insurgents won, made wide use of runners and old communications technologies like ham radios for battle management and other command and control functions (see Arquilla and Karasik, 1999). So, netwar may be waged in high-, low- or no-tech fashion.
Second, netwar is not simply a function of "the Net" (i.e., the Internet); it does not take place only in "cyberspace" or the "infosphere." Some battles may occur there, but a war's overall conduct and outcome will normally depend mostly on what happens in the "real world"--it will continue to be, even in information-age conflicts, generally more important than what happens in cyberspace or the infosphere (Kneisel: see endnotes for references to critical works).
Netwar is not solely about Internet war (just as cyberwar is not just about "strategic information warfare"). Americans have a tendency to view modern conflict as being more about technology than organization and doctrine. In our view, this is a misleading tendency. For example, social netwar is more about a doctrinal leader like Sub-comandante Marcos than about a lone, wild computer hacker like Kevin Mitnick.
A capacity for swarming
This distinctive, often ad-hoc design has unusual strengths, for both offense and defense. On the offense, networks tend to be adaptable, flexible and versatile vis-à-vis opportunities and challenges. This may be particularly the case where a set of actors can engage in swarming. Little analytic attention has been given to swarming (Kelly: see endnotes for references to critical works), which is quite different from traditional mass- and maneuver-oriented approaches to conflict. Yet swarming may become the key mode of conflict in the information age, and the cutting edge for this possibility is found among netwar protagonists.
Swarming is a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions at a particular point or points, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions. This notion of "force and/or fire" may be literal in the case of military or police operations, but metaphorical in the case of NGO activists, who may, for example, be blocking city intersections or emitting volleys of emails and faxes.
Swarming will work best--perhaps it will only work--if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver units. Swarming occurs when the dispersed units of a network of small (and perhaps some large) forces converge on a target from multiple directions. The overall aim is sustainable pulsing--swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, then dissever and redisperse, immediately ready to recombine for a new pulse. The capacity for a "stealthy approach" suggests that, in netwar, attacks are more likely to occur in "swarms" than in more traditional "waves." The Chechen resistance to the Russian army and the Direct Action Network's operations in the anti-World Trade Organization "Battle of Seattle" both provide excellent examples of swarming behavior.
Swarming may be most effective, and difficult to defend against, where a set of netwar actors do not "mass" their forces, but rather engage in dispersion and "packetization" (for want of a better term). This means, for example, that drug smugglers can break large loads into many small packets for simultaneous surreptitious transport across a border, or that NGO activists, as in the case of the Zapatista movement, have enough diversity in their ranks to respond to any discrete issue that arises--human rights, democracy, the environment, rural development, whatever.
In terms of their defensive potential, networks tend to be redundant and diverse, making them robust and resilient in the face of attack. When they have a capacity for interoperability and shun centralized command and control, network designs can be difficult to crack and defeat as a whole. In particular, they may defy counterleadership targeting--a favored strategy in the drug war as well as in overall efforts to tamp organized crime in the United States. Thus, whoever wants to attack a network is limited--generally, only portions of a network can be found and confronted. Moreover, the deniability built into a network affords the possibility that it may simply absorb a number of attacks on distributed nodes, leading an attacker to believe the network has been harmed and rendered inoperable when, in fact, it remains viable and is seeking new opportunities for tactical surprise.
The blurring of offense and defense
The difficulty of dealing with netwar actors deepens when the lines between offense and defense are blurred, or blended. When blurring is the case, it may be difficult to distinguish between attacking and defending actions, particularly where an actor goes on the offense in the name of self-defense. For example, the Zapatista struggle in Mexico demonstrates anew the blurring of
offense and defense. The blending of offense and defense will often mix the strategic and tactical levels of operations. For example, guerrillas on the defensive strategically may go on the offense tactically, as in the war of the mujahideen in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and in both recent Chechen wars with the Russians. The blurring of offense and defense reflects another feature of netwar (albeit one that is exhibited in many other policy and issue areas): It tends to defy and cut across standard boundaries, jurisdictions and distinctions between state and society, public and private, war and peace, war and crime, civilian and military, police and military, and legal and illegal. This makes it difficult if not impossible for a government to assign responsibility to any single agency--e.g., military, police or intelligence--to be in charge of responding.
As Richard Szafranski (1994, 1995) illuminated in his discussions of how information warfare ultimately becomes "neo-cortical warfare," the challenge for governments and societies becomes "epistemological." A netwar actor may aim to confound people's fundamental beliefs about the nature of their culture, society and government, partly to foment fear but perhaps mainly to disorient people and unhinge their perceptions. This is why a netwar with a strong social content--whether waged by ethnonationalists, terrorists or social activists--may tend to be about disruption more than destruction. The more epistemological the challenge, the more confounding it may be from an organizational standpoint. Whose responsibility is it to respond? Whose roles and missions are at stake? Is it a military, police, intelligence or political matter? When the roles and missions of defenders are not easy to define, both deterrence and defense may become problematic.
Thus, the spread of netwar adds to the challenges facing the nation state in the information age. Its sovereignty and authority are usually exercised through bureaucracies in which issues and problems can be sliced up and specific offices can be charged with taking care of specific problems. In netwar, things are rarely so clear. A protagonist is likely to operate in the cracks and gray areas of a society, striking where lines of authority crisscross and the operational paradigms of politicians, officials, soldiers, police officers and related actors get fuzzy and clash. Moreover, where transnational participation is strong, a netwar's protagonists may expose a local government to challenges to its sovereignty and legitimacy by arousing foreign governments and business corporations to put pressure on the local government to alter its domestic policies and practices.
![[image]](networks.jpg)