The deep dynamic guiding our analysis is that the information revolution favors the rise of network forms of organization. The network appears to be the next major form of organization--long after tribes, hierarchies and markets--to come into its own to redefine societies, and in so doing, the nature of conflict and cooperation. As noted in the first session, the term netwar calls attention to the prospect that network-based conflict and crime will be major phenomena in the years ahead. Changes for the better
The rise of networks is bringing many changes for the better. Some hold out the promise of reshaping specific sectors of society, as in writings about the promises of "electronic democracy," "networked corporations," "global civil society," and even "network-centric warfare." Other likely effects are broader and portend the reshaping of societies as a whole, such that writers herald the coming of "the network society," "the network age," and even the redefinition of "nations as networks" (Kelly: see endnotes for references to critical works). In addition, key academic studies of globalization revolve around observations about the growth of global networks and their interconnection with networks at local levels of society (Held and McGrew: see endnotes for references to critical works). Many writings are speculative, but others, particularly in the business world, are usually quite practical, inquiring into exactly what kinds of network structures and processes work, and which do not.
At a grand theoretical level, age-old ideas about life as a "great chain of being" or as a progression of nested hierarchies are giving way to new ideas that networks are the key to understanding all of life. Here, theorists argue that hierarchies or networks (or markets, for that matter) are mankind's finest form of organization, and that one or the other design underlies essentially all order in the world. In the social sciences, for example, some key 1960s writings about general systems theory (e.g., Bertalanffy, 1968) and social complexity (e.g., Simon, 1969) took stances lauding the roles of hierarchy in many areas of life.
But since the 1970s, and especially in the 1990s, ideas have come slowly to the fore that networks are the crucial design. Thus, it is said that "most real systems are mixtures of hierarchies and networks" (Pagels, 1989, p. 51; also La Porte, 1975), and that "the web of life consists of networks within networks," not hierarchies (Capra, 1996, p. 35; also Kelly, 1994). So many advances are under way in the study of complex networks that in the longer run, network thinking will become essential to all branches of science as we struggle to interpret the data pouring in from neurobiology, genomics, ecology, finance and the World Wide Web (Strogatz, 2001, p. 275).
The dark side
Most people might hope for the emergence of a new form of organization to be led by "good guys" who do "the right thing" and grow stronger because of it. But history does not support this contention. The cutting edge in the early rise of a new form may be found equally among malcontents, ne'er-do-wells, and clever opportunists eager to take advantage of new ways to maneuver, exploit and dominate.
Many centuries ago, for example, the rise of hierarchical forms of organization, which displaced traditional, consultative, tribal forms, was initially attended, in parts of the world, by the appearance of ferocious chieftains bent on military conquest and of violent secret societies run according to rank--long before the hierarchical form matured through the institutionalization of states, empires and professional administrative and bureaucratic systems. In like manner, the early spread of the market form, only a few centuries ago, was accompanied by a spawn of usurers, pirates, smugglers and monopolists, all seeking to elude state controls over their earnings and enterprises (Ronfeldt: see endnotes for references to critical works).
Why should this pattern not be repeated in an age of networks? There appears to be a subtle, dialectical interplay between the bright and dark sides in the rise of a new form of organization. The bright-side actors may be so deeply embedded in and constrained by a society's established forms of organization that many have difficulty becoming the early innovators and adopters of a new form. In contrast, nimble bad guys may have a freer, easier time acting as the cutting edge--and reacting to them may be what eventually spurs the good guys to innovate.
The spread of the network form and its technologies is clearly bringing some new risks and dangers. It can be used to generate threats to freedom and privacy. New methods for surveillance, monitoring and tracking are being developed; and the uproars over the intelligence systems "Echelon," "Semantic Forests," and "Carnivore" manifest what will surely be enduring concerns. Critical national infrastructures for power, telecommunications and transportation, as well as crucial commercial databases and information systems for finance and health, remain vulnerable to computer hackers and cyberterrorists.
Furthermore, a growing "digital divide" between information "haves" and "have-nots" portends a new set of social inequities. All this places new strains on the world's democracies. Even worse is the possibility that information-age dictatorships will arise in parts of the world, based on the skillful exploitation of the new technologies for purposes of political command and control.
