Soon after we put the finishing touches on the full volume of Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, from which this seminar was excerpted, terrorists attacked New York and Washington. In doing so, they confirmed the warnings (in retrospect, too briefly stated) that information-age terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda might pursue a war paradigm, developing capabilities to strike multiple targets from multiple directions, i

	Thinking Point
	List the five theoretical models used to analyze the strength and performance of a network, and identify ways in which the al-Qaeda network maps to each of these five levels.

n swarming campaigns that extend beyond an incident or two.

And, as we said was increasingly likely, these terrorists used Internet email and Web sites for their communications, sometimes relying on encryption and steganography for security. The picture emerging of these terrorists' network(s), although still obscure, also substantiates our analysis, which discusses how criminal and other networks have cores and peripheries, with members playing varied, specialized roles.

Our book is suddenly much more pertinent than we had expected. If Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network is the principal adversary--as seems likely, although other possibilities, including sponsorship by a rogue state like Iraq, cannot be discarded yet--then it may prove useful to view the network from the perspective of the five levels of theory and practice: organizational, narrative, doctrinal, technological and social (Garreau: see endnotes for references to critical works).

For the United States and its friends and allies, one challenge will be to learn to network better with each other. Some of this is already going on, in terms of intelligence sharing, but much more must be done to build a globally operational counter-terror network. A particular challenge for the cumbersome American bureaucracy will be to encourage deep, all-channel networking among the military, law enforcement and intelligence elements whose collaboration is crucial for achieving success. US agencies have been headed in this direction for years--in the areas of counter-narcotics as well as counterterrorism--but interagency rivalries and distrust have too often slowed progress.

Regarding al-Qaeda, the organizational challenge seems to lie in determining whether this network is a single hub designed around bin Laden. If this is the case, then his death or capture would signal its defeat. However, the more a terrorist network takes the form of a multi-hub "spider's web" design, with multiple centers and peripheries, the more redundant and resilient it will be--and the harder to defeat. In a somewhat analogous vein, it is worthwhile to note that since Napster's activities were curtailed by legal action in the United States, more free music is being downloaded and shared by loose peer-to-peer networks. Also, note that, despite the dismantling of the powerful Medellín and Cali cartels during the 1990s, drug smuggling by a plethora of small organizations continues to flourish in Colombia. The risk is that small, more nimble networks may spring up as successors to a defeated large network.

In terms of doctrine, the al-Qaeda network seems to have a grasp of the nonlinear nature of the battlespace, and of the value of attack from multiple directions by dispersed small units. If this is indeed a war being waged by al-Qaeda, its first campaign was no doubt the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, followed by a sharp shift to Africa with the embassy bombings of 1998. In between, and since, there have been a number of other skirmishes in far-flung locales, with some smaller attacks succeeding, and others apparently having been prevented by good intelligence. Thus, bin Laden and his cohorts appear to have developed a swarm-like doctrine that features a campaign of episodic, pulsing attacks by various nodes of his network--at locations sprawled across global time and space where he has advantages for seizing the initiative, stealthily.

Against this doctrine, the United States has seemingly little to pose, as yet. Some defensive efforts to increase "force protection" have been pursued, and missile strikes in Afghanistan and the Sudan in 1998 suggest that the offensive part of US doctrine is based on aging notions of strategic bombardment. Needless to say, if our ideas about netwar, swarming and the future of conflict are on the mark, the former is not likely to be a winning approach; a whole new doctrine based on small-unit swarming concepts should be developed.

It is possible that the notion of "counterleadership targeting" will continue to be featured--this was tried against Moammar Qaddafi in 1986, Saddam Hussein in 1991, Mohamed Aidid in 1993, and against bin Laden himself in 1998. Every effort to date has failed, but that may not keep the United States from trying yet again, as this seems a part of its doctrinal paradigm. Besides, if bin Laden is the only hub of the al-Qaeda network--possible, though unlikely--his death, capture or extradition might turn the tide in this conflict.

At the social level, the al-Qaeda network features tight religious and kinship bonds among the terrorists, who share a tribal, clannish view of "us" versus "them." Al-Qaeda's edge in this dimension ties into its narrative level, with Islam being the pivot between the story of "holy war" against "infidels" and the network's ability to recruit and deploy hate-filled, death-bound strike forces who evince a singleness of mind and purpose. Against this, the United States faces a profound defensive challenge at the social level: How will the American people, despite the arousal of nationalism, react to the potential need to become a less open society in order to become more secure? If the Pearl Harbor metaphor--key to the American narrative dimension--holds up, and if US operations result in successful early counterstrikes, then there may be unusual public solidarity to sustain the "war against terrorism" at the social level. But something of a social divide may emerge between the United States and Europe over whether the response to the attack on America should be guided by a "war" or a "law enforcement" paradigm.

In summary, a netwar perspective on the various dimensions of the struggle with al-Qaeda--again, if this is indeed the key adversary, or one of the them--renders some interesting insights into both the context and conduct of this first major conflict of the new millennium. At present,

	Knowledge Test
	Now that you have completed this free seminar, see what you have learned by answering a few short questions on "Networks and Netwar: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy."

bin Laden and al-Qaeda seem to hold advantages at the social and doctrinal levels, and apparently in the organizational domain as well. The United States and its allies probably hold only marginal advantages at the narrative and technological levels. In terms of strategy, there appears to be less room for al-Qaeda to improve. However, its sound doctrinal and solid social underpinnings might be further enhanced--and a vulnerability removed--if it moved further away from being a hub network revolving around bin Laden. Indeed, this may be an optimal strategy for al-Qaeda, since it is delimited from waging an open "battle of the story" at the narrative level, its one other apparent strategic option.

For the United States and its allies, there is much room for improvement--most of all at the organizational and doctrinal levels. Simply put, the West must start to build its own networks and must learn to swarm the enemy, in order to keep it on the run or pinned down until it can be destroyed. The United States and its allies must also seize the initiative--including by applying pressure on any states that harbor or sponsor terrorists.

To be sure, the edge at the narrative level in the world at large must be maintained, but this should be achievable with an economy of effort. The crucial work needs to be done in developing an innovative concept of operations and building the right kinds of networks to carry off a swarming campaign against networked terrorists. Because, at its heart, netwar is far more about organization and doctrine than it is about technology. The outcomes of current and future netwars are bound to confirm this.