Refugee flows and insurgencies often feed one another: The discrimination, violence, and misery that typically accompany civil wars often displace populations that in turn contribute to and sustain the original conflict. This phenomenon was common during the Cold War. For example, Soviet brutality in Afghanistan led to the exodus of millions of Afghans, who subsequently became a major impetus behind the anti-Soviet resistance. The problem of refugee flows has recently become even more acute. The table below compares the total number of refugees in various years over the last two decades. As the totals in the table suggest, the refugee burden was higher for much of the 1990s compared with the decade before the end of the Cold War. Refugees have played a pivotal role in many insurgencies. The Taliban was formed primarily among displaced Afghans, particularly those who had enrolled as Pakistani seminary students. Indeed, almost every Afghan movement drew upon refugees living in Pakistan, Iran, or other neighboring states. Karen refugees helped sustain the Karen National Union's resistance to the Burmese government, while Palestinian refugees supported the PLO for decades prior to the Oslo Agreement. Hutus and Tutsis who fled Rwanda and Burundi contributed to the continuation of conflict in these countries and, after war spread to the Congo, refugees from the fighting there often joined insurgent movements. Insurgent movements in countries as diverse as Ethiopia, Iraq, theRepublic of the Congo, Russia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajikistan have in the same manner successfully recruited among refugees. Without such support, these insurgencies would have lacked fighters, money, and a solid organizational base. Table 4.1
| Total Number of Refugees | | Year | Number of Refugees | | 1982 | 9,800,000 | | 1986 | 11,600,000 | | 1990 | 17,190,430 | | 1994 | 14,488,740 | | 1998 | 11,491,710 | SOURCES http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, <I>The State of the World's Refugees: In Search of Solutions</I> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
NOTE: The figures for the years 1982 and 1986 are rounded. | This session explores how refugees can create and sustain an insurgency, using the experience of the Taliban in Afghanistan to illustrate the impact that refugees have on a successful rebel movement. As with the LTTE experience in Sri Lanka, the Taliban's history is not typical: Rather, it demonstrates how--when the conditions are right--refugees can initiate and prosecute a formidable insurgency and lead it to victory. This chapter concludes by drawing on the Taliban's experience--as well as those of other movements that have relied heavily on refugees--to present more general lessons, both about refugees' contributions to conflict and about what potential limits restrain their role. The Taliban and Afghanistan's refugees
The Taliban of Afghanistan, the dominant Afghani insurgent movement that until November 2001 controlled over 90 percent of the country, was created and sustained by Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. The Taliban has its roots in the Afghan jihad fought against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. During that time, Afghan guerrilla groups used refugee camps as a place to organize, train, and recruit. Afghan women and children took shelter in Pakistan and Iran, while men fought the Soviets, and at times one another. Devastated by years of war, scores of displaced Afghan youth found their only source of education and upbringing in the puritanical Islamic madrassas (seminaries) that sprang up along the Pakistani border. Imbued with an eccentric and virulently discriminatory interpretation of Sunni Islam, these student refugees emerged to form the Taliban militia in the wake of the civil war that was unleashed by the collapse of the mujahedin Afghan government in 1992. The Taliban and its refugee cohorts set out to reunite Afghanistan, bring peace, disarm the population, and establish order under a strict version of the shari'a (Islamic law). The movement's leaders absorbed lessons from the Pakistani madrassas, which emphasized the indivisibility of the Islamic community and the need to extend it through force of arms, and soon became a major sponsor of international Islamic movements. The Taliban appear to enjoy considerable support among many Afghans. These Afghans, even those who do not share the Taliban's extreme religious views, are exhausted by war and welcome any hope of peace. Support is particularly strong among ethnic Pashtuns. Because of this, the Taliban required only limited assistance from outsiders. If Pakistani support had not been provided initially, the group would have found it difficult to gain a critical mass and score initial victories in Afghanistan; over time, however, this support became less important as the Taliban's own skills and resources increased. Drawing on large numbers of volunteers from Pakistani refugee camps, the Taliban steadily overwhelmed other Afghan factions. The group quickly captured and pacified large tracts of the Afghan countryside, earning widespread respect from the Pashtun population exhausted by war and banditry. This grassroots support proved to be a crucial factor in helping to solidify the internal identity and legitimacy of the Taliban and was certainly a key determinant in the group's capture of Qandahar in 1994 and Kabul in 1996. With the seizure of Mazar-i Sharif on August 8, 1998, the Taliban consolidated its hold over most, though not all of, Afghanistan, driving the Northern Alliance, which still holds the country's seat at the United Nations, into a thin sliver of land in the northeast. While the main focus of Taliban insurgent activity since 1994 has been directed toward seizing national power in Afghanistan, the group has also tended to define and pursue wider regional objectives. This has been apparent not only with regard to Central Asia but also to Iran, China (Xinjiang), and Russia (the north Caucasus). Uzbek authorities have long asserted that fundamentalist Islamic revivalism in the Ferghana Valley is directly connected to a deliberate policy of destabilization--orchestrated by the Taliban--and that the Taliban is an important sponsor of the underground Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Officials also believe the Afghan group plays an important role in coordinating the activities of Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz extremists, using money it derives from heroin trade and from the largesse it receives from wealthy non-Afghan Muslims, such as Usama bin Laden, to help fund an international Islamic training camp in the border regions of northern Afghanistan. The Afghan refugees were not alone in their campaign to gain control of Afghanistan. The Taliban movement, which coalesced around the leadership of Muhammad Umar in 1994, drew on the military backing of Pakistan and financial support of Saudi Arabia. Most of Islamabad's military assistance backing was channeled through the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), a radical Islamist political party with strong ties to that country's army, Interior Ministry, and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Department. Between 1994 and 1999, the JUI acted as the Taliban's main recruiter and trainer in Pakistan, drawing primarily upon refugees based in the country's northwest frontier region. This support was in addition to, and quite separate from, the weapons consignments dispatched to Afghanistan as part of Pakistan's publicly stated support for the Taliban. Pakistan also contributed directly to the Taliban's military campaign with its own forces. Pakistani soldiers have periodically fought in Afghanistan at Islamabad's behest, and Northern Alliance officials claim that Pakistan has at times provided air cover. Pakistan helps the Taliban not only to consolidate its power but also to give Pakistani military forces experience at fighting in difficult terrain under varying conditions--experience that would be useful should a conflict occur with India. Financial support to the Taliban primarily comes from Saudi Arabia. Although Riyadh directly provided assistance in the mid-1990s, the movement's protection of bin Laden eventually led to the curtailment of all monetary assistance in 1998 (though not of diplomatic recognition). Since then, funds have emanated mainly from wealthy Saudi individuals and members of the clergy, the bulk of which have gone to supporting the Pakistani madrassas, which continue to act as the main recruiting grounds and doctrinal centers for the ongoing Taliban Afghan jihad.
|
