This final session reviews several of the most important findings of our research and discusses their implications for intelligence analysts and policymakers. It begins by briefly reviewing an obvious lesson: Outside support for insurgency today differs fundamentally from the Cold War period. It then attempts to distinguish which types of external assistance have the most impact. This session concludes by arguing that passive support is an important but often ignored form of backing that allows many movements to flourish.

Moving beyond the Cold War
The indomitable Viet Cong guerrilla, adhering to a tight discipline while he plays his part in a coordinated assault on the South, the UNITA leader in his Western-style "Tiger" camouflage, and the Afghan mujahedin brandishing a Stinger anti-aircraft missile all color our perception of who an insurgent is. But these images mislead. Our analysis suggests that insurgency is displaying a different face today than it did during the Cold War. The PKK, the LTTE, and the Lebanese Hezbollah all are as potent as, or perhaps even more impressive than, the superpower proxies of the Cold War even though they lack superpower support.

The new sponsors, including new state patrons, are different in their means and objectives from Cold War superpowers. In contrast to the United States and the Soviet Union, most state supporters' motivations are local in nature. Gaining influence in a neighboring region or with a rival government are leading objectives, as opposed to contributing to the triumph of a particular ideology or global alliance bloc. Even Moscow, which before the end of communism backed guerrillas in Latin America and Africa as well as in Asia, now uses support for insurgents primarily to gain influence in its immediate neighborhood. In addition, most of the states that remain active supporters of guerrilla movements (e.g., Pakistan, Rwanda, and Iran) are relatively poor and unable to support large-scale insurgencies far from their borders without placing a serious burden on their already-limited finances.

The most important shift that has taken place, however, is the rise in importance of non-state actors, particularly diasporas but also refugees, insurgent movements that sponsor other movements, and religious organizations. States still can offer a far wider range of support than non-state actors, but in several instances, non-state actors have played a major role in funding and otherwise sustaining insurgencies. The figure reviews the relative contributions of different types of outside supporters. As the figure suggests, states provide a far wider range of support and thus can be the most valuable backers of an insurgency. Insurgencies, however, can receive valuable assistance from several other types of outside backers.

Distinguishing among insurgency stages
Measuring the impact of outside support is difficult, because its value is always relative. Insurgents seek externally what they cannot acquire internally: One movement may need a haven; another, weapons; and a third, political support. The value of these types of support thus varies with the particular requirements of the insurgent movements. Moreover, the value of external support depends heavily on the existing strength of a movement. Money given to a poor insurgent movement often has a greater impact than money given to a wealthy one. Similarly, strong insurgencies may receive more support than weaker ones, but the support has only a marginal benefit to the strong while it may be essential to the weaker group. Because the importance of outside support is also relative, the scale of this support does not always correspond with its significance to the insurgency.

The impact of outside support depends greatly on the stage of an insurgency. Outside supporters, even wealthy individuals, can have a tremendous impact at the initial stages of an insurgency. Before an insurgency becomes well established, the relative balance between government forces and those of the insurgents tends to heavily favor the regime. Having a haven from which to organize, a source of arms and money, and protection from the regime's intelligence services--alongside other forms of more tangible aid--can help an insurgent movement survive a government's initial onslaught. Outside support can also enable a group to gain the upper hand on its rivals within the overall resistance. Often, initial resistance consists of scattered and disorganized bands of fighters. Outside support can enable one group to be better armed, trained, and funded: All attract more fighters and thus further increase a group's edge over its rivals. As previously noted, success breeds additional support, creating a positive cycle for the insurgent group. The publicity generated from an insurgent success--or simply from being the group best known to the outside world--makes it more likely that the group will receive aid.

States, however, can often make a difference in helping an insurgency triumph over its government opponent. Particularly when the regime it opposes is weak, it is often easier for a rebel movement to seize a remote region of a country and even undermine government control more broadly. Taking control of the entire country, however, invites many complications. The insurgents must be able to defeat government forces and impose their own rule--a qualitative increase in capabilities from mere subversion. The insurgent movement frequently must acquire more sophisticated arms, be able to conduct conventional military operations as well as guerrilla attacks, govern large swathes of territory and ensure their economic viability, and otherwise fight and act in a completely different manner from that of a small movement living off the land. In addition, a government may gain additional support as neighboring states and other concerned parties increase their aid in order to prevent an insurgent victory.

While money and fighters provided from diasporas, refugees, and other supporters can help in this effort, state support is often necessary to help insurgents reach a new level of political and military effectiveness. Not surprisingly, the majority of insurgencies that have won outright military victories had the strong backing of at least one state--including direct military assistance from that state's armed forces.

The importance of passive support
Sometimes a state's passivity has more of an impact than any formal support it may provide. Diasporas and other interested outsiders often openly raise money, distribute propaganda, and otherwise aid an insurgency's cause with little interference from a host government even when that government generally opposes the insurgents and favors the government they are fighting. It remains relatively easy for many illicit organizations to operate abroad, particularly within democratic states, where concerns about civil liberties, diaspora political pressure, and other factors have led to a de facto toleration for insurgent fundraising activities. Certainly the PKK, the LTTE, and HAMAS, among others, have successfully exploited their respective diasporas and other well-wishers in the West to gain important funding and propaganda assistance.

Similarly, refugees are sometimes able to organize and freely support an insurgent movement with little interference. The initial assumption that refugees deserve international support often blinds governments and international organizations to their active role in an ongoing conflict. Sometimes the international community engages in acts of willful blindness, refusing to recognize what relief workers and local fighters on the ground know well: Aid can fuel or prolong fighting, as well as alleviate suffering.

One of the most important forms of outside support, the provision of a safe haven, often occurs because of a state's weakness rather than its deliberate policy. When states cannot control their borders or exercise effective control over isolated parts of the country, insurgents often flourish. In parts of Central Asia, much of Africa, and elsewhere, insurgents can escape their government adversaries and organize freely.

Final words
This seminar has attempted to describe in broad terms general trends in outside support for insurgent movements and assess their impact. However, a wide range of challenges remain for insurgency analysts. Although this discussion provides a first step that analysts can expand upon and advance in their work, most of the qualitative judgments rendered here are relative: Different factors matter at different times and have different effects according to the strength of government, terrain, overall balance of forces, and a host of other factors. It is therefore imperative that the impact of outside support be considered within the context and contours of a particular conflict environment and measures as part of an overall net assessment of the insurgency's strength, relative to that of the government.

Analysts must also move outside the traditional, country-based focus when assessing insurgencies. The LTTE, for example, depends on a network that ranges from Canada to Thailand; Hezbollah works with Lebanese Shi'a in the triple border area of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil; the Kurds depend heavily on Kurdish workers in Europe; etc. Analysts must assess whether a host government controls or regulates refugees and diasporas in its territory in order to assess the likelihood of which forms of support will be used--an assessment that requires combining knowledge of different regions. Because passive support is so important, analysts must look at what is not done as well as track the flow of arms, money, volunteers, and other active forms of support.