From the early 1990s onwards, it was increasingly recognised in Labour circles that the party had reached some kind of crossroads. The electoral position appeared critical. A period of strong Conservative government had responded to and then reinforced the popular aspiration to 'get on'. Yet Labour had largely failed to react, simply reiterating its traditional nostrums about the importance of collective solutions. As a consequence, many ordinary voters now viewed the party as hostile to talent and opportunity, apparently intent on punishing those who made a success of their lives. If these trends continued, some predicted, there was a real danger that Labour would lose its status as a national political force and become merely a pressure group for the economically marginal and dispossessed--the unskilled, council tenants, the unemployed, and welfare dependants.  

Nick Tiratsoo discusses the impact of Tony Blair on the Labour party in the 1990s and the rebranding of Labour to New Labour. (3:49 min)

The party was initially uncertain in its response to this predicament, but after some sharp internal debate, a group of modernisers gained control and embarked upon a programme of thoroughgoing internal reform. When Tony Blair became leader in 1994, the pace of change quickened. The overriding objective was to make Labour less inward looking and more in touch with the electorate. Blairites emphasised that Labour's core values were still relevant, but argued that they needed to be applied with greater sensitivity to the current context. Means should not be confused with ends. In addition, they were determined to break with the incompetence that had dogged so much of the party's previous electioneering. The upshot was a renewed emphasis on opinion research, the targeting of marginal seats, and the effective use of the media. By 1996, outside observers were concluding that against all expectations Labour had transformed itself into a formidable electoral machine.

The Labour Party

Labour Party poster from the 2001 election, accusing the Conservative party of planning major cuts in public spending.

The 1997 election seemed to vindicate the Blairite approach. Labour won 13.5 million votes, 2 million more than in 1992, 43.2 percent of the total, and enough to produce a Commons majority of 179. Moreover, the party's advance was spread across every region and social group in Britain. It had made especially impressive gains amongst the lower middle class, and in Greater London and the rest of the south-east. The extent and direction of the turnover of votes and seats was comparable to 1945. Yet when the dust had settled, it was apparent that Labour euphoria needed to be qualified. The Conservatives had performed very poorly both before and during the election. The Major government was widely seen as incompetent, while the Tories' once impressive electoral machine had been allowed to languish. One insider went so far as to dismiss Conservative headquarters as 'a 1950s office with a 1950s culture'. On the other hand, there was also room for debate about exactly what Labour's new stance had actually achieved. Party modernisers were bullish, claiming that they had won over large sections of the electorate, but independent experts were less convinced. One team of prominent political scientists and psephologists concluded: 'Labour's campaign machine failed to mobilise anything like Labour's support. Arguably, it consolidated Labour's pre-campaign position ... was effective as a ''banana-skin'' avoidance machine, and helped catalyse effective tactical voting.' In this view, the 1997 result was best understood by reference to the tried and tested maxim that elections in Britain had usually been lost rather than actively won.

Nick Tiratsoo investigates whether Labour has persuaded the electorate to share its wider values. (4:08 min)

Whatever the truth of such claims, the Blairites had certainly made Labour more proficient at fighting elections than at any time in its history. Yet whether the party as a whole was prepared to sustain this development remained open to question. For though many ordinary members strongly identified with the new leadership, traditional reflexes and modes of thinking also persisted. Thus, though Labour had more female MPs than ever before, few believed that discriminatory practices had altogether disappeared. Writing in 1998, Helen Wilkinson, think-tank project director and one-time Blair admirer, claimed: 'The men remain in charge with old Labour's macho labourist culture replaced by a subtler, covert and insidious laddishness.' Moreover, social prejudices, too, endured, with self-styled 'traditionalists' railing against what they saw as the party's capitulation before 'middle-class' sensitivities. Finally, and most seriously, local Labour organisations still seemed worryingly prone to nepotism and corruption. Before the new government was one year old, such strongholds as Doncaster, Hull, South Tyneside and Renfrewshire all found themselves under investigation. In this sense, the Blairites had some way to go before they could claim to have finally harmonised the historic tension between their party's internal and external faces.