Our analysis can only progress at this point if we begin to unpack the terms 'Middle East' and 'West'. The Middle East is divided between pro-Western and anti-Western governments and political forces. The former are supporters of the US in the war against terrorism in so far as it coincides with their own 'anti-terrorist' activities. Such activities are either against Islamist opposition movements, as in the cases of the Algerian, Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, or against ethnic minority groups, as in the anti-Kurdish war in the south-east of Turkey. In contrast to these pro-Western governments, the Iran and Iraq regimes are constituted on anti-Western rhetoric. But it is crucial to note that the fault-lines run within states as well as between them. The divisions in Saudi Arabia over the country's relationship with the US contributed to the emergence of Al Qaeda and have determined Saudi policy towards the US after the 11 September attacks. In almost all the Middle Eastern countries, even those controlled by pro-Western regimes, public opinion tends to be anti-Western and specifically anti-US--sometimes passionately so. As for the Islamist movements in the Middle East as a whole, be they in government or opposition, they thrive on anti-Americanism. Indeed, anti-Americanism defines their political and cultural agendas. What's in the West?
Middle Eastern political actors also make distinctions between how they perceive Western entities and how they relate to them in their foreign policies. Despite rhetorical statements that treat 'the West' as one coherent entity, there is some realisation in the region that there are important divisions within 'the West' with regard to the Middle East. First, European policy towards the Middle East is conducted to some extent on a collective European Union level, but also by individual states. The tension between the collective European interests, as expressed by the EU, and individual national interests continues to define the reality of foreign policy. There are, in turn, differences between individual European states in their foreign policies towards the Middle East. France and Britain are former colonial masters of the region. France has had long-standing interests in North Africa and a special relationship with Iraq. Britain has had long-standing relationships with Gulf states. Spain and other south European states have vital concerns over migration from North Africa. For Germany, the relationship with Israel and therefore with the region more broadly is determined by collective guilt over the Holocaust.
Second, we need to take into consideration the fact that even the foreign policies of single states contain tensions between different actors who contribute to the formation of policy outcomes--and that such tensions can lead to inconsistency in policy. For example, within the current US administration of George W. Bush the battle between 'hawks' and 'doves' over Middle Eastern policy has resulted in variations in the style, tone and substance of policy since 11 September. The initial apparent willingness on the part of the US to apply pressure on Israel to settle the Palestinian issue and encourage rapprochement with Iran was later replaced. The current preparedness to attack Iraq, although not a foregone conclusion, would also signify a predominance of hawkish forces within the Washington corridors of power.
![[image]](21701764_rumsfeld.jpg)
US Department of Defence | Donald Rumsfeld addressing the press. Donald Rumsfeld, defence secretary of the United States, is considered of the "hawks" in the Bush administration. Along with vice-president Richard Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, he strongly advocates aggressive military action and is in favour of action in Iraq. |
The US and Europe
Third, and most crucially, there are deep tensions between US and European policies toward the Middle East. European policy-makers tend to have a less Manichean picture of international relations and of the Middle East than their American colleagues. Their commitment to Israel can be described as less robust (or less blinkered, depending on one's point of view) than that of the US. They have greater familiarity with Muslim culture and a more pressing need to understand and accommodate Muslim minorities that live in the midst of European societies. Last but not least, they lack the breadth of geo-strategic interests and concerns of the US. Economic interest is in relative terms more important for Europeans.
US foreign policy, on the other hand, contains a strong unilateralist strand that makes it more prepared to 'go it alone'--in preparing to attack Iraq, for example. Compared to Europe, the US has applied force more readily in dealing with the problem of terrorism. It is less prepared to apply pressure on Israel to settle the Palestinian issue than European states are. Finally, it persists in ostracising Iran, contrary to the European Union's willingness to engage with the country. But none of these characteristics of US foreign policy are set in stone. As mentioned above, the debate over Middle East policy still continues in Washington.
The distinctions between Western actors are crucial in understanding how the relationship between the West and the Middle East developed after 11 September, and how it could evolve in the future. The initiative now is with the West, so analysts are waiting to see how policy will be formulated on that side of the equation. The key issues for the region are Iraq and Palestine, and public sympathy in the Middle East is firmly behind both of them. If the US fails to pursue the creation of a Palestinian state and attacks Iraq, pro-Western forces in the region may be unable to hold their ground against an upsurge of anti-Western feeling. This would increase the strain in the relationship between the West and the Middle East by deepening the anti-Western animus in the region. The result could be to create more fodder for terrorism. It could also further concentrate political action in the Middle East against 'the West', while diverting energies from the real issues of economic and political development that should be preoccupying the region.
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| Thinking Point | |
| Do you think the West can be referred to as one coherent entity? | |
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The impact of 11 September on the relationship between the West and the Middle East has not been all negative. The crisis has focused Western minds on the deeply problematic and stagnated nature of politics in the region. It has encouraged some thinking towards differentiating between interpretations of Islam. It has sown doubt in Western minds about Western policies and how they are received in the non-Western world. On the part of the Middle East too, 11 September intensified debate about what Islam is and who can speak on its behalf. It also led to some debate about who 'the West' is and what its role should be in the Middle East. If these benign outcomes are not marginalised in the longer term, they may provide some light at the end of the tunnel for the relationship between the West and the Middle East, and thereby benefit the future course of world politics.
