Whether or not cloning by nuclear substitution was actually covered by the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 has been a matter of some disagreement. Section 3(3)(d) of the Act prohibits replacing the nucleus of a cell of an embryo with a cell taken from another person or embryo, but Dolly was created by replacing the nucleus of an egg with a cell taken from an adult sheep. Similarly, although a licence from the HFEA is necessary to bring about the creation of an embryo, an embryo is defined as being "a live human embryo where fertilisation is complete". Since fertilisation does not take place when a cell is cloned, on a literal interpretation, there might not be an embryo for the purposes of the Act. This apparent lacuna was seized upon by the Pro-Life Alliance, who brought an action alleging that the HFEA had no power to regulate human cloning in the UK. Although they succeeded at first instance, the Court of Appeal held that a purposive interpretation of the Act was legitimate. Parliament must have intended that all embryos should be subject to the HFEA's regulatory powers, and so they were entitled to construe the legislation to that effect. In the meantime, the Government brought forward emergency legislation, the Human Reproductive Cloning Act of 2001, which makes it a criminal offence, punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment, to place an embryo created otherwise than by fertilisation in a woman.

Hello Dolly In 1996, Dr. Iam Wilmut of the Roslin Institute in Edinburgh, successfully cloned a sheep from the udder of a six-year-old sheep. The resulting embryo -- which became Dolly -- carried all of the chromosomes from the donor udder cell and none of the nuclear chromosomes from the host egg cell. Therefore, Dolly is an exact genetic copy -- a clone -- of her donor-cell "mother." This cause an international sensation as it was the first successfully cloned entity. Scientists attempted the procedure 277 times before successfully cloning Dolly.

Dolly and Bonnie There has been concern that cloned animals might be prematurely aged, or infertile, and this would limit their use in producing therapeutic proteins. In 1998, after she was mated with a mountain ram however, Dolly gave birth in a normal manner to Bonnie, a healthy lamb Professor Graeme Bulfield, director of the Roslin Research Institute, said : ""It's important from our point of view that it demonstrates that cloned animals from adult cells are capable of being fertile and will breed normally."

In the years following the announcement of Dolly's birth, public and political opinion has become more accepting of cloning as a technique to produce replacement tissue for people suffering from degenerative diseases, and in January 2001, Schedule 2(3)(2) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act was amended in order to permit the HFEA to grant licenses to carry out stem cell research. So although it could, subject to the granting of a license by the HFEA, now be lawful to create cloned embryos for research purposes, reproductive cloning is--and is likely to remain--illegal.

Regulation: Emily Jackson examines the regulation of human reproductive cloning. She discusses how the law finds it difficult to keep pace with science and the implications of the cloning of Dolly the sheep for legislation. (4:46 min)

There are people for whom cloning might offer the only plausible or appealing reproductive option. There are those, such as couples in which both partners are infertile, who might prefer to avoid using donated gametes. And, of course, duplication of one's genetic material might appeal to people with more dubious motives. I will consider the reasons commonly given for maintaining an absolute prohibition upon human reproductive cloning. I argue that the only convincing, and as yet decisive argument is that reproductive cloning is not yet sufficiently safe.

Arguments against cloning
Safety The most compelling reason not to allow human reproductive cloning is that it would currently present intolerable health risks. Before research can be conducted upon humans, trials in animals must establish that the experiment has a reasonable prospect of success and that any associated risks are not unacceptably high. The burden of proof lies with the researcher, and although an absolute guarantee that a procedure is risk-free would be unworkable, cloning in animals has not reached this threshold level of safety or efficacy. Dolly was the sole survivor following the successful transplantation of nuclei to 277 enucleated ewe's eggs. Cloning experiments on animals have found high rates of spontaneous late abortion and early postnatal death. Given that there seems to be some evidence that "somatic cloning may be the cause of long-lasting deleterious effects" in animals, it would obviously be unethical to conduct research into human reproductive cloning.

When reproduction consists in the mixing of two sets of genetic material, an abnormal gene from one parent may be paired with a normal gene from the other parent, thus diluting the impact of any genetic mutations. Because cloning bypasses this random mixing of genes, there has been speculation that it might thereby lose its associated benefits and lead to an increased risk of cancer or immunological disease. In addition to the risks of multiple miscarriages and serious abnormalities, we do not yet know the extent to which the advanced age of the cloned cell would affect the aging process in the cloned person.

While concerns about the safety of reproductive cloning currently undoubtedly require a moratorium upon research, for most people, the fact that it is not currently safe is not the principal reason for continuing the blanket prohibition upon human reproductive cloning. Rather, there is a widely shared assumption that there is something unacceptably disturbing about the possibility of cloning human beings. Opinion differs as to whether this visceral unease derives from a principled ethical objection to cloning, or whether it amounts to little more than an irrational gut reaction. While it may be true that some people are repelled by the prospect of human reproductive cloning, intuitive feelings of disgust do not necessarily justify restricting other individuals' reproductive options. So assuming that at some point in the future experiments upon animals indicated that cloning could safely be attempted on humans, are there other reasons that would justify maintaining the prohibition upon human reproductive cloning?

Dignity There are those who would argue that cloning an existing child to produce another who would, for example, be a perfect match for a bone marrow transplant violates the Kantian imperative that we should never treat a person solely as a means to another's end. Stephen Robertson, for example, has suggested that cloning presents "the greatest opportunity so far in history actually to treat people merely as means and not as ends". But this "Kantian principle, invoked without any qualification or gloss is seldom helpful in medical or bio-science contexts", otherwise we should have to prohibit blood donation, non-therapeutic research on human subjects and live donor organ transplants. It is also unclear that a child created in such circumstances would be treated exclusively as a means to the end of helping their older twin. If the child were abandoned following the donation, then this would undoubtedly be an unacceptable exploitation of a human life. But once a child has been born, parents are under a legal obligation to support her until she reaches the age of majority. Parents can already choose to have another child because there is a good chance that that child may prove to be a compatible bone marrow donor for an older sibling, and it is surely probable that in such circumstances the child will be loved and cherished as an individual in his or her own right. It could even be argued that people frequently decide to reproduce for reasons much less honourable than saving an existing child's life, such as wanting an heir or trying to salvage a failing relationship. We might not approve of their motives, but neither would we feel that application of the Kantian imperative compels us to prevent them from reproducing.

Identity Popular science fiction has contributed to the public misperception that human cloning would lead to the manufacture of 'photocopied' individuals on an automated artificial production line. The assumption that cloning violates the right to one's own unique identity is, however, founded upon some fundamental misunderstandings about genetics. Monozygotic twins share identical DNA, yet there is no doubt that each twin is a separate person with his or her own identity. The human brain is extraordinarily complex and even genetically identical twins will be born with different neural connections. These differences will increase as their experiences and environment shape their neural development. Having a unique genotype is not, therefore, an essential prerequisite of individual identity.

It is also important to remember that cloning does not consist in the spontaneous conversion of a cell from the DNA source into a human embryo. Rather the technique known as Cell Nuclear Replacement (CNR) involves introducing a nucleus taken from an adult human cell into an unfertilised egg that has had its nucleus removed. This new egg cell is then treated to encourage it to grow and divide, forming first a two-cell structure and then developing in a similar way to an ordinary embryo. While most of this new embryo's DNA will be identical to the DNA contained in the nucleus taken from the adult cell, the outer shell of the denucleated egg does contain some additional genes, known as mitochondrial DNA. Since a clone and its DNA source will not usually share the same mitochondrial DNA, their genotypes may even be subtly differentiated. There are 37 genes in human mitochondrial DNA and their principal role is to control energy metabolism in human cells. The contribution mitochondrial DNA makes to differences between individuals is not fully understood, although mutations in maternal mitochondrial genes undoubtedly increase susceptibility to certain rare but fatal human diseases. Hence, it may not even be strictly accurate to describe a clone as a delayed twin. But even if it were, the existence of this delay will mean that the clone and the DNA source will be less alike than monozygotic twins. Their uterine environments; their childhood experiences and their upbringing will all necessarily be entirely different. Since the way in which genes express themselves is influenced by a person's environment, the clone and the DNA source will not be identical in either appearance or character.

Misconceptions:Emily Jackson discusses common misconceptions about human reproductive cloning. The most compelling argument against human cloning is on grounds of safety, but she says that other arguments put forward against it are less persuasive. (4:33 min)

But even if it is accepted that a clone will not be an exact duplicate of the DNA source, and that monozygotic twins do not offend against the principle that we each have a right to our own identity, there will probably be significantly more similarity between a clone and his or her DNA source than happens with the intrinsic genetic randomness of an egg's fertilisation by a spermatazoa. So although parents can already reproduce because they would like offspring that resemble them, or because they want to produce a tissue donor for an older sibling, cloning would considerably increase their chance of success. That reproduction could consist in the duplication of an existing person's DNA, rather than the random lottery of inherited appearance and characteristics to which we are accustomed, is undeniably unsettling. Unlike other forms of assisted conception that continue to rely upon the haphazard mixing of two sets of genetic material, cloning would introduce a new element of human control over the transmission of our genes.

American Film Institute

Bladerunner, initially released in 1982 is one example of the public's fascination with the possibilities of cloning. Blade Runner tells the story of a bounty hunter dispatched to hunt down four genetically engineered human android "replicants."

The argument is further made that even if we acknowledge the differences that will exist between the clone and the DNA source, the expectation of similarity will significantly impair a clone's capacity for individuality. For example, the Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, which specifically prohibits human cloning, argues that "naturally occurring genetic recombination is likely to create more freedom for the human being than a predetermined genetic make-up."

According to this line of argument, every individual should have the right to an open future, and someone who is the clone of their parent will instead be burdened by the anticipation of uncanny resemblance between the lives of the parent and his or her clone. And it may be true that a parent might be particularly fascinated by the development of a child who has been cloned from their DNA. Yet is this actually very different from the interest parents commonly have in their children's inherited characteristics? People who grow up in the shadow of a successful older sibling already often feel constrained by their parents' unreasonable expectations. So if we are really concerned to protect children from oppressive parental pressure and a correspondingly 'closed future', we should have to closely examine the parenting practices of many people who reproduce in the ordinary way.

This argument against cloning is further weakened by the fact that this supposedly oppressive expectation of similarity is, as we have seen, based upon a series of mistaken assumptions about genetic determinism. The clone would not be a 'carbon copy' of the DNA source, and their personality, appearance and health would all differ markedly. Expectations that are grounded in ignorance are surely not a good justification for restricting reproductive freedom, otherwise we might also have to consider preventing reproduction among people who believe, for example, that boys are cleverer than girls.

Family relationships

	Thinking Point
	Do you think human reproductive cloning would threaten familial relationships?

Because a cloned child would not be produced through the mixture of his or her parents' gametes, but through the replication of one person's DNA, some people have expressed concern about its impact upon family relationships. It has even been suggested that such a fundamental change in the nature of kinship would in turn have a profound effect upon social stability. For example, cloning raises the possibility that a woman could reproduce without using a man's gametes. If lesbian and single women could have children entirely autonomously, there is inevitable speculation about the future redundancy of men. While children conceived using donated gametes also have no genetic connection with one of their parents, a cloned child would have an unprecedented genetic identity with one parent and it is impossible to tell what impact this might have upon the family. However, speculation about the dangers for familial relationships may rest in part upon the misguided assumptions about genetics that we considered earlier. The child will not be a miniature version of their DNA source, rather, just like children born following donor insemination, they will share certain inherited characteristics with only one of their parents.

Diversity This argument against cloning rests upon the assumption that procreation which involves the random redistribution of genetic material from two different genotypes leads to a healthy genetic diversity among the population, and that this would necessarily be impaired by permitting reproduction that consists in the replication of an individual's DNA. This sort of anxiety is misplaced for several reasons. First, the clone's genotype will in fact be the result of the mixing of two sets of genes: those of the DNA source's mother and father. Second, the clone will also inherit the mitochondrial DNA from the de-nucleated egg, so its genetic inheritance is not completely identical to that of the nuclear DNA provider. Third, as John Harris points out, the human genome was not threatened 2,000 years ago when the world's population, and hence genetic diversity, was perhaps 1 percent of what it is today.

If cloning becomes possible, the number of clones is likely to be infinitesimal, compared with the number of babies produced 'normally' by the world's 6 billion people. Given the cost and inconvenience of cloning, the number of artificially produced clones is not even likely to be as high as the number of clones that result from natural twinning. As a result, it would be difficult to argue that the health of the human species would be endangered by reproductive cloning.

Slippery slope Slippery slope or 'thin end of the wedge' arguments are commonly cited as good or even sufficient reasons to prohibit any research into human cloning. Three related assumptions underpin slippery slope arguments. First, it is predicted that a new technology could be put to some extremely undesirable uses. Second, there is judged to be a high chance that someone will employ the new technology to these undesirable ends. Third, our capacity to institute effective regulation to prevent this undesirable use of the new technology is doubted.

If, so the argument goes, we permit scientists to conduct research into cloning human embryos in order to grow replacement tissue for people suffering from degenerative diseases, we automatically face an unacceptably high risk that disreputable scientists will offer to clone narcissistic millionaires or mad dictators. According to this sort of argument, if it would be unethical to produce 100,000 clones of one person, then it must also be unethical to produce one clone. But this is simply illogical. We might similarly want to argue that it would be undesirable for one sperm donor to father thousands of children, but this does not mean that we have to prohibit the practice of donor insemination. Rather, this concern instead leads us to impose upper limits on the numbers of children who can be born from one donor's gametes.

	Thinking Points
	Do you think human reproductive cloning should be legalised? Do you think there is a realistic danger of it being put to ill-use?

And what exactly is this abuse of which we are so afraid? The slippery slope argument against cloning undoubtedly relies upon a disproportionate fear of legions of mad scientists whose curiosity and desire for self-advancement will always impel them to go beyond the limits set for them by the law. As we saw earlier, the stereotype of the crazed scientist pushing back the frontiers of knowledge regardless of the social consequences has developed a strong hold upon the popular imagination. Gradual public acceptance of therapeutic cloning again reveals an interesting distinction that tends to be drawn between doctors, who are assumed to act ethically and beneficently in their patient's best interests, and scientists, who are assumed to be prepared to act unethically in their pursuit of knowledge and self-aggrandisement.

Slippery slope arguments therefore rely both on some alarmist ideas about scientific amorality and on the rather defeatist assumption that our ability to control inappropriate applications of cloning technology is inevitably and irreparably undermined by a decision to permit some scientists to carry out research into the cloning of human embryos. The claim that a technique could be abused is not an adequate justification for banning it unless we have also established that it would be impossible or exceptionally difficult to prevent its abuse. So we can only prohibit human cloning on the grounds that it might be abused once we have concluded that there is little or nothing we could do to stop that abuse materialising. Rather than pessimistically presuming that satisfactory regulation is a logical impossibility, it might be more logical to consider how the feared misuse of reproductive cloning techniques could be prevented.

Confidentiality Although it is undoubtedly true that a person's appearance, characteristics and abilities are not determined by their DNA, there are a few medical conditions that are caused by genetic abnormalities. If someone with the gene that causes Huntington's disease were to be cloned, the clone would also have the relevant gene, and would therefore develop the disease. Since the DNA source's knowledge of their genetic make-up translates (aside from mitochondrial differences) into identical knowledge about the clone, significant questions about genetic confidentiality may arise. By the time human reproductive cloning becomes safe enough to attempt in humans, this problem is likely to have been exacerbated by advances in the breadth and accuracy of genetic testing.

Confidentiality issues already arise between family members who undergo genetic tests, and these are obviously especially pronounced for identical twins where the discovery of a genetic abnormality in one twin is tantamount to a positive diagnosis for the other one. The existence of confidentiality problems is not, however, a sufficient reason to prevent cloning. Rather, if human reproductive cloning were to become possible, rules that already exist in relation to the cross-referencing of information from different family members would need to accommodate the special implications of a parent and child with a shared genotype.

In favour of human reproductive cloning
In the next few years, human reproductive cloning is likely to remain too hazardous to satisfy the threshold safety requirements for research trials on human subjects. The chief argument in favour of allowing reproductive cloning if and when it ever becomes sufficiently safe is that it would add to the reproductive options already available, and enhance procreative choice for people who might not otherwise be able to have children. Despite the extraordinary advances in infertility treatment over the last 25 years, there are still people who cannot be helped to reproduce using the existing technologies. The principal argument in favour of reproductive cloning is simply that we should do all that we can to alleviate involuntary childlessness. There are also, of course, compelling practical reasons for bringing every available reproductive technique within the control of the law. If human reproductive cloning becomes safe enough to attempt on humans, it is obviously preferable that it should be carried out within a rigorous regulatory framework than in some shadowy black market.

Cloning benefits: Emily Jackson discusses the benefits of human reproductive cloning. She argues that the main argument in facour is that it expands the choices open to infertile couples. (1:33 min)

It is undeniable that the regulation of human reproductive cloning would raise some novel dilemmas. Who, for example, are the parents of a child born following human reproductive cloning? There are even more possibilities than the multiple options created by existing assisted conception techniques. Relatively straightforward is the scenario in which a man's nuclear DNA is inserted into an egg retrieved from his partner, who then gestates the cloned embryo to term. Then we realistically have two biological parents: mother and father. But if the egg and its mitochondrial DNA were to be contributed by a third party, would we have a third biological parent? Similarly, if a lesbian couple were to use one partner's nuclear DNA and the other partner's egg and mitochondrial DNA, does that child have two biological mothers? Where the DNA source is also the gestating woman, does the child have only one biological parent? None of these permutations has a simple solution, and all are further complicated by the fact that the parents of the person contributing their nuclear DNA may also have a plausible claim to be treated as the parents of their child's 'delayed twin'.

In addition, new consent provisions might also be important to ensure that the DNA source had given free and informed consent to be cloned. And just as restrictions are already put upon the number of children who can have the same gamete source, there might need to be some limit on the number of clones derived from one person's DNA.

In these sessions, I have argued against restrictive regulation of reproductive technologies. Regulation, I would suggest, should have two principal purposes. First, and uncontroversially, it must ensure that treatments meet some threshold level of safety. Second, I argue that it should be concerned to promote procreative liberty. Restricting people's freedom to exercise control over their reproductive lives is an unwarranted intrusion into an area of personal life where one's capacity to take decisions according to one's own beliefs and priorities is of particular importance. Individuals' vastly differing perspectives upon the moral propriety of interfering in the processes of human reproduction should, I argue, be respected. So people who disapprove of prenatal testing, abortion or reproductive technologies should be under no obligation to undergo any such treatments themselves. Healthcare workers too must have the right of conscientious objection to participation in any such treatments. But no one should have the right to impose his beliefs about something as intimate as reproduction upon others. In addition, there are practical reasons to be in favour of largely permissive regulation. Enabling treatments to be provided in the UK limits UK citizens' resort to procreative tourism, and allows new technologies to be subject to a comprehensive regulatory structure. In sum, legislators and regulators are indubitably ill-equipped to make moral judgements about how, when and whether an individual should be permitted to procreate.