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Traditions of Obedience in Islamic Law
From: Cambridge University Press
| By:
Khaled Abou El Fadl |
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION |
To western observers, Islam appears to demand the obedience of its adherents in a way that radically differs to the democratic tradition. Early Islamic thinking about rebellion provides us with a window into the basis of the contemporary situation. In this extract from his book Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law, Khaled Abou El Fadl looks at two traditions of thought in Islamic history, which became the raw material that ultimately formed the basis of later juristic discourse on the subject of obedience and counter-obedience. Additionally, in an interview conducted during October 2001, he comments further on these traditions in Islamic law. |
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| Khaled Abou El Fadl outlines the early traditions of obedience and rebellion in Islamic law. | |
  l-Hafiz Abu Bakr al-Shaybani (d. 287 [900 CE]) quotes an impressive array of reports attributed to the Prophet on the necessity of obeying those in power. A genre of these reports counsels that a Muslim should obey whoever is in power, even if the one in power is a "mutilated Abyssinian slave" (see Al-Shaybani, Kitab al-Sunnah, 1993, pp. 29, 445, 491). The symbolic construct here is not necessarily one of blind obedience but one of non-critical obedience. In other words, one can possibly interpret this genre of reports to simply mean that the physical, racial, or ethnic attributes of a ruler are irrelevant. However, a similar genre of reports goes further, and asserts that the Prophet commanded that Muslims must obey rulers under all circumstances. A typical form for this genre is the following: It is reported that the Prophet said, "Listen and obey, in hardship and in good, in what is pleasant or unpleasant, and prefer them [the rulers] over yourself even if they usurp your wealth or strike your backs" (ibid., pp. 478-9). Some reports provide a justification for this methodical imperative of obedience by claiming that the Prophet said: "Who obeys me [the Prophet], he has obeyed God, and who disobeys me, he has disobeyed God. Who obeys the ruler (al-amir), he has obeyed me and who disobeys the ruler, he has disobeyed me" (ibid., pp. 492-4). Several traditions attributed to the Prophet create a moral distance between the actions of rulers and their followers. As long as Muslims are obedient, they will not be held responsible before God for the indiscretions or injustices of rulers. Rulers are solely liable for their own injustices, Muslims are responsible for a separate religious imperative of obedience (ibid., pp. 485, 496). |
Law and rebellion
Nonetheless, these reports must go further. A good legal mind could distinguish these reports, and maintain that they are largely inapposite to a case of rebellion. For example, one could argue that these traditions relate to the duty of obedience, but that they do not relate to the issue of choice of leader. In other words, once we acknowledge a specific person as a ruler, then obedience is due. However, a group that chooses an alternative ruler, a leader of a rebellion for example, owes, pursuant to these traditions, the same unequivocal obedience to the leader of the rebellion. Hence, other reports are needed that more explicitly and specifically prohibit rebellion. One such report states that the Prophet's Companion Abu Dharr al-Ghifari (d. 32/652) was sleeping in the Medina mosque when the Prophet woke him up and said, "Why do I see you asleep here?" Abu Dharr said: "Oh Prophet, I was overcome by sleep." The Prophet asked: "What would you do if you were forced out of it [the mosque of Medina]?" Abu Dharr said: "I would accept the holy blessed land of Sham." The Prophet then inquired: "What would you do if you are forced out of it?" Abu Dharr then puzzled: "What should I do? Should I take my sword and go out striking with it [i.e. rebel]?" The Prophet said: "Shall I tell you what is better and nearer to piety? (The Prophet repeated the phrase twice.) You listen and obey, and go whichever way they lead you" (ibid., p. 497). The report is obviously staged, but the dramatic effects of the story are an integral part of the emotional impact of the message. Despite the emotional place of holy mosques in which one feels sufficiently tranquil and secure to the point of falling asleep, and contrary to the intuitive impulse to resist by force any denial of the right to be in a mosque, it is closer to piety not to use force. Even if one is expelled from the most holy of mosques, one must not rebel. The message of this hadith is bolstered by reports that explicitly state that one should not contest or rebel against unjust rulers as long as the rulers permit prayers to be performed. The most a Muslim should do is passively and quietly condemn the injustices and sins being committed, but a Muslim should not rebel (ibid., pp. 495, 501). The message is made abundantly clear in the genre of traditions that states that whoever rebels after the nation (umma)or community (jamaca) has united or agreed on a leader should be killed, whoever he may be (ibid., p. 512). Another report of the same type asserts that the Prophet said: "The blood of a Muslim who attests that there is no God but God and that I am the Prophet of God, may not be shed except for three reasons: 1. adultery, 2. murder, and 3. the abandonment of religion and rebellion against the community" (ibid., pp. 30-1, 421). Other reports prohibit the cursing, slandering, or even hating of rulers regardless of their merit or lack of merit (ibid., pp. 473-6). The only recourse against unjust rulers is patience (ibid., pp. 509-11). These reports typically command that one steadfastly adheres to the community and not deviate from the jamaca ( plurality or community). |
These reports, as strong and clear as they may sound, beg the question: What is the jamaca to which one must hold steadfastly? It is possible to dilute much of the strength of these reports by debating and reconstructing the definitions of jamaca. For example, Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1350-1) argued that the jamaca means those who follow the straight path (al-haqq) and adhere to the truth. Therefore, the jamaca could be a single person, and the vast majority of Muslims could be contra to the jamaca. For instance, in the days of the mihna, Ibn al-Qayyim argued, the vast majority of scholars deviated from the truth and Ahmad b. Hanbal persevered on the right path. Hence, he alone became the jamaca, and the rest of the people deviated from the jamaca. Of course, Ibn al-Qayyim's argument is not entirely original. The traditionist Muhammad al-Bukhari (d. 256/870) much earlier raised the issue of what one should do if there is no jamaca. Al-Bukhari then cited a tradition that asserts that in the absence of a jamaca, one should isolate oneself and abandon all the contentious groups in society (al-Bukhari, Sahih iv: 225). Effectively, Ibn al-Qayyim and others took the reports on the possibility that a jamaca would not exist, and reconstructed them into a discourse in which the minority, or even one person, would become the jamaca. Regardless of the merits of these arguments, they demonstrate the power of theological or legal interpretation in distinguishing and reconstructing traditions (raw material) in order to reach certain results. |
Early attitudes
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| The author describes tensions in the traditions surrounding obedience and radical Islam since the death of the prophet. | |
At this point, it is important to note that the traditions emphasizing the impermissibility of using force against Muslims or the necessity of obedience to those in power were quite widespread in the first two centuries of Islam. Most of the early collections of hadith include one version or another of these kinds of reports (ibid., pp. 221-3). Although most of these sources were written in the third/ninth century, these traditions must have come into circulation much earlier. Considering the scale and nature of the rebellions during the Umayyad period, it is very likely that most of the traditions demanding unquestioning obedience came to existence in the first/seventh century. Furthermore, these traditions seem to have been incorporated in the jurisprudential discourses early on. cAbd Allah b. Ahmad (d. 290/902) reported that his father, Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855), strongly disapproved of those who disobeyed the ruler or who failed to support him. Even earlier, the Hanafi judge Abu Yusuf (d. 183/799) cites many of these traditions, including a tradition attributed to the Prophet, which commands that one should obey every ruler (amir) and pray behind every imam without distinction. Another tradition, cited by Abu Yusuf, alleges that al-Hasan al-Basri (d. 110/728) reported that the Prophet said: Do not slander the rulers (al-wula), for if they do good, they will be rewarded, and you should be grateful. If they do evil, they will incur the sin [of the deed], and you must show patience. They [the rulers] are God's punishment which God sends upon whomever He wants. Do not meet God's punishment with anger and resistance. Meet God's punishment with acceptance and prayer (Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj, p. 10). Another genre of traditions is even more specific in scope; these traditions condemn the Khawarij or Haruriyya, and counsel Muslims not to get involved in fitan. The fitan traditions, generally, in their typical form quote the Prophet as predicting that there will come a time when civil discord will spread, and Muslims will fight each other. The Prophet then counsels that a pious Muslim should refrain from becoming involved in these compromising situations (al-Bukhari Sahih, iv: 221-33). Alternatively, a Companion, quite typically Ibn cUmar, would advise other Companions or pious Muslims not to become involved in rebellions, even against someone such as Yazid b. Mucawiya, who is often considered the epitome of injustice, impiety, and corruption. Some versions of the fitan reports specify that the people in Sham (the Umayyads), Ibn al-Zubayr in Mecca, and the Qurra in Basra were all fighting over worldly affairs, and were all engulfed in a fitna, therefore, a Muslim must refrain from joining any of the contending parties (see ibid., iv:221-33). The traditions specifically dealing with the Khawarij often assert that the sect had deviated from Islam and that they were the dogs of hellfire (see Al-Shaybani, Kitab al-Sunnah, p. 424). Some reports specify that the Khawarij were to be considered the baghiya (rebellious or deviant) group, and encourage that they be fought and killed (ibid., pp. 419-47). In many versions, the Khawarij are not referred to by name, but are identified by implication. These reports claim that there will come a time when zealots with little understanding of the religion will shed the blood of Muslims. If they are found, the reports assert, they must be killed wherever they may be found. Other reports quote the Prophet as condemning the Rafida (Shica), and calling upon all Muslims to fight them. Arguably, because these traditions address specific historical conflicts, they tend to restrict the scope of the obedience traditions. In other words, by mentioning specific historical incidents or groups (such as the Khawarij or the rebellion of Ibn al-Zubayr or the Shica), these traditions become applicable only to these particular sets of facts. For example, if the rebellion of the Khawarij or Ibn al-Zubayr is condemned, that does not necessarily mean that the rebellion of al-Husayn b. cAli or al-Nafs al-Zakiyya is equally reprehensible. Arguably, one can distinguish these reports on the facts of each case. This in fact was the chosen methodology of some late jurists who argued that regardless of what one might say about Ibn al-Zubayr's rebellion, for example, al-Husayn b. cAli's rebellion was justified. This gap or loophole, so to speak, is somewhat bridged by traditions that provide that one should not chide or attempt to counsel a ruler (amir) if the result could be the spread of fitna. Pursuant to this logic, the prohibition against fitna is not limited to particular conflicts that took place in Islamic history, but extends to prohibit any situation that might result in a fitna. Likewise, it is not the Khawarij, as a specific historical entity, that is reprehensible, but any other group that follows in its footsteps. This is particularly the case considering that in early legal discourses the word often used for rebels in general was khawarij (those who exit or rebel). |
The counter-obedience traditions
The Qur'an consistently demands the establishment of justice and the removal of oppression. For instance, it states: "Why do you fail to fight in the cause of God, and for the oppressed men, women, and children who pray, 'O Lord, get us out of this city whose people are oppressors, and send us by Your Will an ally and send us an aid'" (Qur'an 4:75). In fact, the idea of fitna is equated in the Qur'anic discourse with the existence of injustice and oppression, and not with rebellion or civil war. Fitna is often described in the Qur'an as a pervasive state of oppression by arrogant and unjust rulers. While the Qur'an does not explicitly command insurrection or rebellion against unjust rulers, it does create a powerful symbolic construct that can be easily utilized to justify armed resistance to oppression (see Qur'an 9:12, 23:34, 43:54). |
Partly because of the inconsistency between the Qur'anic symbolism and the obedience traditions, the Muctazili al-Hakim al-Bayhaqi (d. 458/1065) accuses non-Muctazili Muslims of having fabricated the traditions that demand that every usurper of power be obeyed, even if he is an Ethiopian slave, and whether he is just or not (Al-Bayhaqi, Risala Iblis ila Ikhwanihi al-Manahis, 1986, p. 97). One suspects that he is quite right. Nevertheless, an accusation of fabrication was not the chosen methodology of the vast majority of Sunni jurists. There are many Sunni jurists who simply ignored the obedience reports. But even more jurists, as we will see, distinguished these reports on technical grounds. Very few, however, declared the reports fabricated. There are a variety of reasons for this, among them the place that hadith and Sunna achieved in the early juridical culture. More importantly, the inherent conservatism of juridical culture does not usually opt for radical solutions such as declaring a whole body of precedent an invention or fabrication. I do not wish to imply that Sunni jurists would have necessarily wanted to unequivocally and consistently negate the obedience traditions. In fact, these traditions served an important function when Muslim jurists wished to advocate order and stability. However, a unitary, unwavering reliance on the obedience traditions would have rendered any discourse on rebellion impossible. Significantly, even had jurists wished to emphasize a unitary duty of obedience, they still would have had to distinguish or otherwise deal with the counter-traditions on obedience. |
Perhaps the most important and compelling counter-tradition is the practice and conduct of many of the Prophet's Companions and several of the early jurists who took part, supported, or sympathized with a variety of rebellions. To condemn unequivocally all forms of rebellion, in all circumstances, would raise serious questions as to the credibility of several of the most honored figures in early Islamic history. In fact, the opponents of rebellion, or the advocates of non-rebellion, focused most of their legal energy on distinguishing, limiting, or explaining away the behavior of the early Companions or jurists. If rebellion was to be declared a sin, some argument had to be found for arguing that the honored forefathers did not commit a sin by rebelling. Even more, the conduct of some of the Companions and jurists was bound to generate counter-traditions that would explain or legitimate their behavior. Again, the counter-traditions represent tendencies or trends in early legal opinions but are not developed systematic positions. |
Most counter-traditions appear in the same hadith sources that cite the obedience traditions. It is very likely that both types of tradition appeared contemporaneously. The obedience and counter-obedience traditions manifest an unmistakable tension that never becomes fully resolved in the later writings of jurists. This tension is well demonstrated, for example, in a tradition in which al-Hasan al-Basri (d. 110/728) reportedly tells al-Hajjaj that the Prophet ordered: "[We] respect and honor the rulers (al-salatin) because they are God's pride and shadow on this earth if they are just." Al-Hajjaj, apparently surprised by this version of the tradition, intimates that he had heard this tradition before, and declares: "[The hadith] never said 'if they are just.'" Al-Hasan promptly answers, "Yes, it [always] did" (see al-Zamakhshari, Rabic, v:161). In order to get a fuller sense of this tension, we will survey some of these counter-traditions in order to get a sense of the diversity and complexity extant in the sources of the time. |
Tensions and traditions
We have already mentioned the tradition which states that one must obey a ruler even if he is an Abyssinian or Ethiopian slave. Some versions of this report add the contingency that such a person should only be obeyed as long as he implements the book of God, and, in some versions, as long as he leads Muslims in accordance with the book of God (Al-Shaybani, Kitab al-Sunnah, p. 492). Other reports make the duty of blind obedience applicable only in the time of the Prophet. Such reports quote the Prophet as saying: "Listen and obey as long as I am with you. After I die, take the book of God, [implement its commands] and make what it makes permissible, permissible, and prohibit what it prohibits" (Ibn Hanbal, Musnad, ii:279). A set of widely cited traditions explicitly states that a ruler should not be obeyed if he commands a sin, or that he should be obeyed only to the extent that he commands what is good and just (Abu Dawud, Sunan, iv:94). This general imperative was put into the form of an interesting narrative which was later heavily cited in juridical sources. According to this narrative, a man from the Ansar was put in charge of a military expedition, and the Prophet commanded the soldiers under the man's charge to obey him. After leaving on their expedition, the soldiers upset the commander for an unidentified reason. In response, the commander then ordered that a sizable fire be lit, and ordered his soldiers to throw themselves into the fire. When the soldiers hesitated, the commander said, "Didn't the Prophet command you to listen and to obey me?" The soldiers, however, remarked, "We have found refuge in the Prophet from Hellfire," and refused to obey. When the Prophet was told of the incident, he declared, "If they [the soldiers] would have obeyed and walked into the fire, they would have never come out [i.e. they would have burned in hell forever]. Obedience is due only in what is good and just" (Muslim b. al-Hajjaj, al-Jamic, vi:16). Another version of this report insists that the whole matter started out as a joke. According to this version, the commander ordered the fire lit, and then said, "Don't you have a duty to obey me?" The soldiers said, "Yes." The commander inquired, "So if I tell you to do anything, you will do it?" The soldiers, again, said, "Yes." "Then," the commander asserted, "I order you to jump into the fire." But observing that the soldiers were about to comply with his order, the commander yelled out, "I was just joking with you." When the Prophet was informed of the incident, he said: "If someone orders you to commit a sin [i.e. kill yourselves in this situation], you should not obey" (Ibn Maja, Sunan, ii:956). |
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| Professor Abou El Fadl reflects further on Muslim jurist culture and traditional legal discourse about terrorism. | |
 In another fascinating, but most certainly apocryphal, report, the tensions engendered in the counter-obedience traditions are fully and dramatically displayed. It is reported that Mucawiya's supporter and governor cAmr b. al-cAs was sitting near the Kacba talking to a group of people about the Prophet and his times. Ibn al-cAs explained that the Companions, himself included, were traveling with the Prophet when they stopped to rest. The Prophet called the people to prayer but before they started praying, the Prophet spoke to the Companions and explained that it is incumbent upon every prophet to warn his people about the good and evil that will eventually befall them. The Prophet warned that after he died there would be much chaos and many fitan until the heart of every Muslim would be gripped by terror. The Prophet then said that when this takes place, those who would like to escape hellfire and enter heaven, let them die while believing in God and the Hereafter, let them treat others as they would want to be treated, and let them not violate an oath of allegiance they gave to a ruler (imam). The Prophet continued, "So, if one comes to challenge him [the imam], then strike his neck [i.e. the challenger]." The man listening to the sermon took Ibn al-cAs to the side and said, "By God, did you really hear the Prophet say this?" Ibn al-cAs pointed to his ears and heart and said, "Verily, my ears have heard it and my heart has absorbed it." The man said, "But your cousin Mucawiya commands us to usurp each other's money and commands us to kill each other while God has said ...[Qur'anic verse omitted]." Ibn al-cAs fell silent for a while pondering the man's comment then said, "Then obey him [Mucawiya] in what is consistent with God's commands, and disobey him if he orders you to disobey God" (Muslim b. al-Hajjaj, al-Jamic, vi:18). In this tradition, an obedience report is confronted and neutralized by a counter-obedience report. Ibn al-cAs,Mucawiya's confidant and supporter, is made to admit that the commands of God come before all else, even before his master and benefactor, Mucawiya. |
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