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Beware of Cracks in the Counterterrorism Coalition
From: RAND
| By:
Jerrold D. Green |
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION |
The creation of a US-led global coalition against terrorism can only be achieved with support from an assortment of regional powers in the Middle East, argues Jerrold Green, director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy and of International Programs and Development at RAND. Will the US consider compromising its role in Afghanistan to gain support from neighboring Iran? Can the Bush administration justify progress on the Palestinian-Israeli front if it means losing counterterrorism support from the Arab coalition? And can the US successfully unseat Saddam Hussein without angering key politicians in the region?
In this article published in the Summer 2002 RAND Review, Green briefly summarizes US engagement in three Middle East countries and explains how US policy decisions in this region could actually hinder international counterterrorism initiatives. |
 number of regional challenges that have arisen in the Middle East since September 11 have complicated the ability of US policymakers to focus on the global war on terrorism. Although this war is clearly the first priority of the United States, effectively waging such an ambitious and wide-ranging military campaign depends on extensive global diplomatic, political, intelligence and economic efforts as well. US military initiatives can potentially be affected by US initiatives in these other spheres. |
An overarching concern of those charged with conducting the war on terrorism is the importance of building and maintaining a global coalition. This priority is enormously important both symbolically and practically. For despite the awesome power of the United States, it is inconceivable that even Washington could tackle this monumental task on its own. |
What is worrisome today is that US policymakers are involved in a series of political engagements throughout the Middle East, many of which may unintentionally operate at cross-purposes with one another. Although Washington's primary commitment is to the war on terrorism, which is of necessity sustained by a broad-based international coalition, those in Washington must also confront a number of other challenges in the Middle East, the successful execution of which may possibly come at the expense of the same antiterrorism coalition that the United States has so painstakingly constructed. Granted, not all crises can be resolved by the same coalitions, and some partnerships can be sustained only at a cost to others. But nowhere in the world is this complexity more evident or perilous than in the Middle East. |
Afghanistan: where cracks can lead to chasms
The United States has committed itself not only to the destruction of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but also to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The successful loya jirga, or traditional assembly, paved the way for the government of Hamid Karzai to exercise power with the support of the United States. With the ascent of Karzai, as opposed to other Afghan competitors, tensions have inevitably arisen within Afghanistan as well as among some of its neighbors. These tensions complicate US involvement in Afghanistan to some degree and potentially even US relations with the neighboring states. |
Perhaps the country most outspoken about its concern with events in Afghanistan has been neighboring Iran. As the Karzai government consolidates its power, other regional actors are likely to express concerns of their own, including possibly Pakistan, with its deep, long-standing, and not necessarily constructive interests in and ties with Afghanistan. |
The process of nation building, particularly in a setting as fractious as Afghanistan, necessarily provides power to some while depriving it of others. Invariably, these internal groups and interests have external corollaries. Thus, although we cannot predict with any certainty who will lose and who will win in Afghanistan, we can be certain that the ensuing power struggle will affect Afghanistan's neighbors and thus Washington's ability to keep intact a regional coalition against terrorism as well. |
To complicate matters further, signals from the White House seem to indicate that the United States may cease its attempts to engage the moderate wing of the Iranian government as represented by President Mohammad Khatami. These signals echo President Bush's earlier assertion that Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, belongs to an "axis of evil" hostile to the United States. The implications of these messages are unclear; however, President Khatami has already responded to them in stinging language. At the very least, policymakers must now consider how the increased tensions between Washington and Tehran could possibly interfere with US aspirations in surrounding countries. |
Iraq: where the coalition collapses
The Bush administration has made no secret of its eagerness to see the reign of Saddam Hussein and his clique come to an end. Although Saddam has few admirers in the Arab world or in Europe, Washington's aversion to him has become increasingly aggressive, whereas the others' aversion is theoretical rather than practical. |
A serious debate is raging in Washington over the degree to which the United States should forcefully hasten the political demise of Saddam. The debate in Washington obscures a larger problem: The US quest for regional support against Saddam Hussein may be at odds with the US campaign against terrorism. It is highly revealing that although a number of senior members of the Bush administration have traveled the Middle East in general and the Arab world in particular to seek support for US military action against Iraq, the results have been uniformly disappointing. |
Most Arab leaders argue that the United States should make progress on the Palestinian front before storming the Iraqi front. This recommendation is somewhat disingenuous, largely because the Arab leaders themselves offer little tangible assistance to the Palestinians, and their admonition is offered simply as an excuse to justify their opposition to US military action against Iraq. What the Arab leaders really fear, of course, is the response of their own people and the ensuing fallout should they support US military action against a fellow Arab state. |
While the debate on military action against Iraq is complex, one clear policy consideration emerges. That is, any attempt by the United States to forcefully unseat Saddam Hussein must be weighed against the possible risks to the US-led coalition against international terrorism. In that coalition, support for the United States by an assortment of regional powers in the Middle East is imperative but far from certain or immutable. |
Israel and the Palestinian lands: where there is not yet a coalition
Here again, US policymakers are confronted with tensions and cross-pressures, which make US regional diplomacy on behalf of the coalition against international terrorism exceedingly difficult. The United States has been confronted with serious deterioration in the Palestinian-Israeli sphere, with a spate of catastrophic suicide bombings against Israel and a correspondingly forceful Israeli military response. We've seen the military reoccupation of parts of the West Bank, the building of a wall between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors, mass arrests, restrictions on the movements of Yasser Arafat and other attendant military actions. |
Although the United States wishes to play the role of an honest broker, its Arab coalition partners are more sympathetic to the cause of the Palestinians than they are to the plight of the Israeli people and Ariel Sharon. This situation further complicates US attempts to defuse the growing crisis between the Israelis and Palestinians. |
President Bush has offered a new US peace plan, but it is highly controversial and seems certain to influence his ability to operate elsewhere in the Middle East. Put simply, Bush has come out in favor of the gradual creation of a Palestinian state, which raises concerns in Israel. At the same time, Bush is insisting that the Palestinians replace Yasser Arafat with another leader who is less duplicitous and more amenable to making peace. The latter part of the formulation has discomfited an Arab world that is concerned about Washington trying to decide who should lead the Palestinian people, regardless of Washington's unambiguous support for a Palestinian state. In addition, the Arab world is concerned about Washington's inability as yet to provide details about a Palestinian state or a timetable for this effort. |
How and if these divisions will affect other US regional interests is as yet unclear. There is something in the Bush peace plan to satisfy both Israelis and Arabs, and yet there is ample room for disagreement and conflict as well. Although the new Bush plan may appear to threaten US ties with Israel and/or with the Arab world, the ties are unlikely to unravel. The situation is so potentially inflammatory that most parties appreciate the need for Washington to do something. Beyond that, however, whatever Washington does may be subject to criticism within the Arab world. |
Washington: where cross-purposes collide
Although none of the above challenges are new, the fact that they have arisen simultaneously presents the Bush administration with a unique and particularly difficult set of policy decisions to juggle. There is a good deal of uncertainty within the administration on how to deal with each of these issues individually. When aggregated into an entanglement of regional foreign policy challenges with global implications, they become much more complicated and potentially even baffling. |
Will progress be made on the Palestinian-Israeli front at the expense of the international coalition against terrorism? Or at the expense of US-Arab or US-Israeli relations? To what degree does the threat of Saddam Hussein justify jeopardizing the coalition against terrorism or other US regional interests? For example, action against Saddam might make it more difficult to negotiate an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, because Arab antipathy to the United States could drive Arab states to oppose the Bush peace plan--which itself is not free of controversy. |
An endless number of possible scenarios of this sort can be played out, all of which highlight how difficult the situation is for the Bush team. It is forced to deal with the daunting dangers of international terrorism, a newly confident Iraq, and a festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It remains to be seen how effectively President Bush and his advisers can make their way through this enormously threatening regional environment. |
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