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The United States and a Rising China
From: RAND
| By:
Zalmay M. KhalilzadAbram N. ShulskyDaniel L. BymanRoger CliffDavid T. OrletskyDavid ShlapakAshley J. Tellis |
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION |
China is a rising power that could have the capability, in the not too distant future, of challenging the United States' position in East Asia, as well as American military, political and economic access to the region.
In this summary of a multiyear study of China's modernization and its implications for the United States military, entitled The United States and a Rising China, a RAND research team, led by Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, addresses how US policy should deal with China, evaluating China's relationship with foreign nations, the state of its military and the effectiveness of different American political and military strategies. |
 ince 1978, China has been embarked on a fundamental process of reform and modernization that has resulted in an unprecedented rate of economic development. Some analysts predict that this will enable China's gross national product to overtake that of the United States in the early part of the next century. Although China currently lags far behind the United States militarily and technologically, a robust Chinese economy will likely be capable of underwriting rapid and dramatic improvements in these areas as well. |
This report discusses the major issues China's modernization raises for the United States. It looks at how China is likely to behave in world affairs and the challenges that behavior may pose, what strategy the United States should follow to deal with those challenges, and how the China factor should inform U.S. political-military activities in the East Asian region. |
Determinants of Chinese behavior
At present, the most important determinant of China's foreign-policy behavior is its pursuit of "comprehensive national power." The goal is to make China a developed country, which would have the effect of, among other things, raising the standard of living of the population and preparing the technological-industrial base for a strong military. In pursuit of modernization, the leadership has relaxed its internal controls over the population and has opened the country to foreign influences. In addition, the Chinese leadership has recognized that good relations with the United States are strongly advisable, if not absolutely necessary, for the success of its pursuit of "comprehensive national power." However, two other drivers of Chinese policy--concern for sovereignty (e.g., eventual reunification with Taiwan) and regime maintenance (i.e., the maintenance of Communist Party rule)--place important limitations on the extent to which China's desire for good relations with the United States will determine its behavior. |
Once China becomes fully modern or advanced (something which is hard to imagine happening before 2050), it could become a major rival for world power. But before that, China could prove a
difficult military adversary¹
in East Asia, a region of vital importance to the United States. A militarily and economically strong China might also offer an alternative to the current U.S. role as the region's preferred security partner and its ultimate security manager. A China that approached or equaled the United States in power would presumably seek to vindicate its territorial claims and could strive to attain regional hegemony, increase its status in global terms, and alter the rules of the international system to its advantage. Both realist theory and the Chinese tradition of belief in its own geopolitical centrality in Asia would suggest such a result. Four developments could lessen the prospects for such a negative outcome: |
First, the Chinese leadership could retain its current emphasis on the importance of good relations with the United States even as the country successfully modernizes. For one thing, the modernization process will not have a clear-cut endpoint; even after several decades of successful economic and technological development, China will likely be behind the United States in many respects, and the leadership may still feel the need to "catch up." More fundamentally, the dynamism of technology and the global economy is such that even the most advanced countries quickly find that they must remain open to each other if they wish to keep pace; no country is able on its own to develop all relevant technologies to world-class standards. Hence, no country can cut itself off from the rest of the world without quickly falling behind. |
Second, and most optimistically, the Chinese leadership could undergo an "acculturation" process, by which it becomes more and more willing to abide by the general norms of the current international system. Thus, this theory goes, although China's current acquiescence in these norms may be tentative and "insincere," driven solely by the need for foreign contributions to China's modernization, the leadership will gradually come to understand that these norms can serve China's interests as well. By the time China becomes strong enough to challenge the current international order, it will have become reconciled to it. |
Third, the opening of China to the world, the relaxation of restrictions on travel and communication and the rapid growth of an educated middle class raise the possibility of a transformation of the communist regime in the direction of more democracy. Although the process of democratization could produce aggressive external behavior, the attainment of democracy can be expected, based on the experience of other democracies, to lead China to adopt a generally cooperative strategy. |
Fourth, because of any of a number of difficulties in the economic, social and political realms, China could face chaos or collapse, which would reduce its ability to mount a major challenge to the United States, although it could lead to other problems. It is possible that a failing regime would be tempted to undertake aggressive external policies to gain increased domestic legitimacy. Alternatively, a weak regime might become more inward-looking and be less focused on, and/or less capable of, vindicating its claims to Taiwan or the South China Sea. In any case, a chaotic China could become a source of refugee flows that could threaten to swamp neighboring countries or that could encourage non-Han populations in China to seek independence. |
Chinese military in transition
Military modernization is an important Chinese goal. However, China has been pursuing this objective as a long-term strategic program as opposed to an urgent requirement. China does not want to do what the Soviet Union did, i.e., place an unbearable burden on its economy by spending too much on its military forces. But it also does not intend to follow Japan in limiting its military capabilities to a level far below what its economy could support. |
Although China today has the world's largest armed forces, it is indisputably not a "peer competitor" of the United States. Nevertheless, the current Chinese military possesses four important characteristics that differentiate it from the "standard" major theater war (MTW) planning cases, such as Iraq and North Korea:
- China has nuclear weapons that can reach U.S. territory.
- The People's Liberation Army (PLA) fields a variety of surface-to-surface missiles that would prove especially problematic for current and near-term future U.S. ballistic missile defenses.
- The absolute size of the PLA would present challenges.
- China's geographic extent may make it very difficult for U.S. forces to reach and attack the full range of targets that the U.S. military would anticipate striking in the course of an MTW.
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Thus, even today's PLA--ponderous, poorly trained, and ill-equipped as it is--presents unique and more demanding planning and operational challenges to U.S. strategists contemplating a possible
confrontation with China².
However, China recognizes its military weaknesses and has embarked on a sustained two-tracked approach: arms purchases from abroad and indigenous development to modernizing the PLA, which, if sustained through the first several decades, would greatly intensify those challenges. Indigenous development is also facilitated by espionage (theft of technology and/or plans for weapon systems), as well as by the covert acquisition abroad of export-controlled components, manufacturing equipment, and other technology. |
Given current trends, China could emerge, by 2015, as a formidable power, one that might be labeled a multidimensional regional competitor. Such a China could credibly
- exercise sea denial with respect to the seas contiguous to China
- contest aerospace superiority in a sustained way in areas contiguous to China's borders
- threaten U.S. operating locations in East Asia with a variety of long-range strike assets
- challenge U.S. information dominance
- pose a strategic nuclear threat to the United States.
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U.S. policy toward China
Given the potential for both positive and negative developments with regard to Chinese behavior, what U.S. policies are most appropriate? The fundamental U.S. policy toward China has been one of "engagement," which seeks to maintain and enhance relations with China as much as possible in the various policy realms. Engagement rests on the assumption that continued contact affects Chinese behavior in a positive direction and produces economic benefits for the United States. In the meantime, however, it helps China develop economically and technologically: Hence, if engagement does not lead to more cooperative Chinese behavior, it may have helped China become a potentially more threatening adversary in the future. |
Some have suggested that containment would be a more realistic way to deal with the prospect of a powerful China in the future. However, containment would be a very difficult policy to implement: First, it would be hard to obtain a domestic consensus to subordinate other policy goals (including trade and investment) to dealing with a Chinese threat that is as yet, to say the least, far from manifest. Second, containment would require, to be effective, the wholehearted cooperation of regional allies and most of the other advanced industrial countries of the world; again, such cooperation would be difficult to obtain. In general, containment seems to accept as fated something that does not appear to be inevitable; seems unnecessarily to resign itself to an unfavorable outcome, while overlooking the possibility that Sino-U.S. relations could evolve in a more cooperative direction; and would create a confrontation where none existed. |
Given the difficulties surrounding both containment and engagement, a combination of the two policies appears, for the present, to have the best chance of preserving the hopeful potential of the engagement policy while hedging against its possible inability to negate a future Chinese challenge to U.S interests and objectives. Such a "third way" policy would continue to try to bring China into the current international system while both preparing for a possible Chinese challenge to it and seeking to convince the Chinese leadership that a challenge would be difficult and extremely risky to pursue. The elements of such a policy would be |
- Modified Engagement. This policy would modify current engagement by being less solicitous of Chinese sensitivities on such issues as human rights and by making a greater effort to impose sanctions on specific Chinese companies that, for example, exported nuclear sensitive materials, violated U.S. export control laws, or otherwise thwarted major U.S. objectives.
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- Strengthening of Ties to Regional Countries. The United States would seek to strengthen its ties to regional countries so as to be in a better position to enable them to resist any possible future Chinese aggression. Steps should include promoting improved relations among East Asian states so as to facilitate their cooperation on security issues in the future should China become hostile. This would be aimed at emphasizing to China the costs of, and thereby deterring, any Chinese attempt at seeking regional hegemony.
- Dealing with the Taiwan Issue. The United States would emphasize the importance of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and would help the Taiwanese preserve the status quo for as long as uncertainty about China's future course endures. Should China evolve in a democratic and friendly direction, U.S. policy could shift toward one of encouragement and support for voluntary reunification; if China became fundamentally hostile, the United States could support a strengthening of Taiwan's de facto independent status.
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Should a more-powerful China push for regional hegemony or attack Taiwan, the "third way" policy could be turned into containment. But should China become democratic and cooperative, this "engage and hedge" policy would give way to a partnership between the two countries. |
Implications for the U.S. military and the USAF in particular
The "third way" policy has important implications for the future of U.S. military forces. These may be considered under the three headings of shaping the political-military environment, deterrence, and warfighting. |
The main shaping role the U.S. armed forces play is to maintain overall military superiority and the specific ability to defeat threats to vital interests from a potentially hostile China. However, as part of a policy of engagement, the USAF, as well as the rest of the U.S armed forces, has a role to play in conducting military-to-military contacts with the PLA. Such contacts can help shape China's strategic perceptions; strengthen deterrence; increase transparency; and, by developing personal ties between officers on either side, provide a valuable informal communications mechanism that can be useful from day to day and could prove vital in time of crisis. |
In addition to conducting military-to-military contacts, the U.S. armed forces must be able to deter China from taking steps contrary to U.S. interests. In some cases, that will involve demonstrating an evident ability to prevent China from attaining its goals via the use of force. Historically, it has been difficult to deter China from taking a wide range of undesirable actions, especially when they have been designed more for their political than their military effects. To deter China, even those who were more powerful have had to threaten high levels of violence. Thus, the United States must consider the psychological impact of Chinese use of force as well as the need to threaten high levels of violence to deter China. |
Ultimately, of course, U.S. armed forces must be prepared to defeat China militarily if it threatens vital U.S. interests. Chinese military modernization poses many potential challenges for the U.S. armed forces, and the USAF in particular, as they seek to maintain a margin of military superiority over China. Among the most important implications for the USAF are |
- Dealing with the Potential Threat of Chinese Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles. The U.S. military, including the USAF, should seek to provide defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles. The USAF should place increased emphasis on longer-range platforms that could be based outside the range of most future Chinese attack systems.
- Assuring Air Superiority. The USAF should continue to field aircraft and munitions with low-observable ("stealth") characteristics and reevaluate the planned purchases of next-generation munitions as planned numbers may be insufficient to wage an effective campaign against a modernized PLA.
- Protecting U.S. Space and Information Systems. The Chinese, perceiving themselves to be far less dependent on space than the United States, could consider initiating a counter-space campaign. The Chinese might also seek to disrupt U.S. ability to respond to its aggression by attacking U.S. information systems.
- Ensuring Access to the Theater. The USAF should consider options for improving access to the Western Pacific. Besides ensuring continued access to Japanese and Korean bases even after Korean unification or reconciliation, a greater emphasis on Southeast Asia is required to enable the United States to respond to contingencies in that region and the South China Sea as well.
- Putting Greater Emphasis on Longer-Range Systems. The current force mix is dominated by short-legged systems. Given the distances involved in the Pacific, the USAF should review its modernization plans for the middle term and consider changes that would emphasize longer-range systems such as medium range bombers and stand-off long range (cruise or ballistic) missiles and, over the very long term, space-based systems.
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